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SEIZING THE MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN
RULES AND STANDARDS IN DESIGN DEFECT
LITIGATION: ADVANCING DIRECTED VERDICT
PRACTICE IN THE LAW OF TORTS
AARON

D. TwmEsmi*

Professor Twerski arguesthat the declineof singlefactorno-duty rules in the product
liabilityfieldhas not eliminatedlawmaking in dirccted rerdict practicebut has only
altered its character.After showing how, in principle, courts may base findingt of
"no duty" on a multiplicity of policyfactors, ProfessorTwerski presents a number of
such factors and urges courts to weigh them when entertainingdirected cerdicts.
The Article concludes with a discussion of judicial opinions that illustrate the rudiments of a multifactor approach.
INTRODUCTION

The age of "reasonableness" and risk-utility balancing is upon us.'

*Professor of Law, Hofstra University; A.B., 1962, Beth Medrash Elyon Research Institute,
B.S., 1970, University of WVisconsin-Milwaukee; J.D., 1965, Marquette University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Professors David Fischer, James
Henderson, Jr., David Owen, and Malcolm Wheeler, who read and critiqued the manuscript.
This article was written, in part, while the author was a visiting professor at the Boston
University School of Law. Many members of the faculty colloquium made excellent suggestions
which were incorporated into the text. In addition, the author wishes to thank Michael Hoenig,
of Herzfeld & Rubin, for his helpful comments. Finally, Shlomo Twerski, a third.year student at
Hofstra Law School, provided not only technical assistance but valuable insights to the author in
the preparation of this article.
Most of the recent literature in products liability has focused on the reasonableness test
and the appropriateness of risk-utility balancing as a method for establishing defects. See
Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict
Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1980) [hereinafter Birnbaum, Unmasking the
Test for Design Defect]; Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56
N.C.L. Rev. 643 (1978) [hereinafter Epstein, Middle Ground]; Henderson, Renewed Judicial
Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 773 (1979) [hereinafter Henderson, Renewed judicial Controversy];
Henderson, Manufacturers" Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. Rev. 625 (1978) [hereinafter Henderson, Proposed Statutory Reform]; Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 Ind. L.J. 467 (1976)
[hereinafter Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept]; Henderson, Judicial Review of
Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1531
(1973) [hereinafter Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices]; Hoenig, Product Designs
and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach? 8 Sw. U.L. Rev. 109 (1976); Keeton,
Products Liability-Design Hazards and the Meaning of Defect, 10 Cum. L. Rev. 293 (1979)
[hereinafter Keeton, Design Hazards]; Phillips, The Standard for Determining Defectiveness in
Products Liability, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 101 (1977); Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products
Liability, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 435 (1979); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Pichler, The Use and
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To the delight of some 2 and the distress of others, 3 courts have abolished many of the firm no-duty rules that posed absolute barriers
Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 Cornell L.
Rev. 495 (1976) [hereinafter Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Use and Abuse of Warnings]; Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehlier, Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From
Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 347 (1980) [hereinafter Twerski, Wcnstein,
Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives]; Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their
Actionability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 551 (1980) [hereinafter Wade, Design Defects].
Most courts have adopted risk-utility analysis as either an exclusive or an alternative ground
of liability. See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071-73 (4th Cir.
1974) (exclusive ground); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979)
(alternative ground); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38 (1978) (alternative ground); Lewis v. Bucyrus-Erie, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 920
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (exclusive ground); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 NJ. 150,
170-71, 406 A.2d 140, 150-51 (1979) (alternative ground); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d
376, 386, 348 N.E.2d 571, 577-78, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976) (exclusive ground); Wilson v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 67-68, 577 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1978) (exclusive ground); Turner
v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex. 1979) (exclusive ground); Morningstar v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 682-83 (W. Va. 1979) (exclusive ground).
Federal statutes also use the reasonableness concept in setting design standards. See, e.g.,
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1392(0 (1976); Consumer Product
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2056(a), 2058(c) (1976).
This heavy emphasis on risk-utility theory (instrumentalism) has its passionate supporters
who believe that liability rules serve the goals of allocative efficiency and wealth maximization.
See, e.g., Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. Legal Stud. 103 (1979)Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972); Shavell, Strict Liability Versus
Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980). Not so passionately supporting this approach are scholars
who believe that tort law is or should be premised on fairness. See, e.g., Epstein, Defenses and
Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J.Legal Stud. 165 (1974); Epstein, A Theory
of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
Harv. L. Rev. 537 (1972) [hereinafter Fletcher, Fairness and Utility]. A third view would
combine both fairness and efficiency to fashion tort doctrine. See G. Calabresi, The Cost of
Accidents (1970). In a provocative article, Professor Henderson has recently argued that process
norms have a significant impact on the substantive content of tort rules. Henderson, Beyond
Fairness and Efficiency: A Process Perspective on Tort Law, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 901 (1982). This
Article borrows liberally from the varying approaches in formulating the multifactor duty
analysis.
2 Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturers' Liability for
Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1065 (1973) (supports standard of strict liability
for manufacturers of patently dangerous products) [hereinafter Marschall, Obvious Wrong];
Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the Products Liability
Era, 60 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1974) (supports abolition of patent danger rule and replacing It with a
"reasonableness" test) [hereinafter Twerski, Restructuring Assumption of Risk]; Ursin, Strict
Liability for Defective Business Premises-One Step Beyond Rowland and Greennan, 22
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 820 (1975); Note, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon
v. Legg in California and Other States, 25 Hastings L.J. 1248 (1974) (supports rule permitting
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental
Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 Ceo. L.J. 1237 (1971) (supports development of
cause of action for negligent infliction of mental distress); Comment, Occupier of Land Held to
Owe Duty of Ordinary Care to All Entrants-"Invitee," "Licensee," and "Trespasser" Dlstinc.
tions Abolished: Rowland v. Christian, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 426 (1969) (supports abolition of
limited duty responsibilities of a landowner depending on the status of entrants as trespassers,
licensees, or invitees.
3 Epstein, Middle Ground, supra note 1, at 646-58; Henderson, Expanding the Negligence
Concept, supra note 1; Hoenig & Goetz, A Rational Approach to "Crashworthy" Automobiles:
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preventing plaintiffs from establishing that a defendant's behavior or
product failed to meet the standard of societal acceptability. 4 In no
area of the law is this phenomenon more pronounced than in product
liability. Since the landmark decision in Henningson v. Bloomfield
Motors Inc.,5 such firmly embedded concepts as privity,G the patent
danger doctrineJ shifting duty, 8 the intended purpose doctrine, and
The Need for Judicial Responsibility, 6 Sw. U.L. Rev. 1 (1974) [hereinafter Hoenig & Coctz,
Crashworthy Automobiles].
4 The risk-utility test sets societal standards for acceptable risk levels. In another forum, the
issue was formulated in the following manner:
The issue in every products case is whether the product qua product meets so ety's
standards of acceptability. The unreasonable danger question, then, is posed in terms of
whether, given the risks and benefits of and possible alternatives to the product, we as a
society will live with it in its existing state or will require an altered, less dangerous form.
Stated succinctly, the question is whether the product is a reasonable one given the reality
of its use in contemporary society.
Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 1303, 1307 (1974) (footnote omitted); accord Keeton. Design Hazards,
supra note 1, at 313-14.
5 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1970).
6 The tortured history of the privity doctrine is wdl told in Cillam, Products Liability in a
Nutshell, 37 Or. L. Rev. 119 (1958) and Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other
than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 Va. L. Rev. 134 (1937). Two articles by Dean Prosser remain
classics in the field. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 Minn.
L. Rev. 791 (1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
Yale L.J. 1099 (1960). Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 35S. 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
signaled the demise of the privity doctrine. It was followed by Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods.,
Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), in which the court diminated privity
in a strict liability tort action. Relying on these cases, a majority of states have adopted a doctrine
of nonprivity strict liability. See, e.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d
955 (1976); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S. 2d 461 (1973); Dippel
v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
" Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802, 100 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1950), was the
leading case supporting the rule that a manufacturer was -under no duty to render a machine or
other article 'more" safe-as long as the danger to be avoided is obvious and patent to all.Id. at
472, 95 N.E.2d at 804, 100 N.Y.S.2d at 472. Campo became the object of vitriolic academic
attack. See, e.g., F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts § 28.5 (1956); Marschall, Obvious
Wrong, supra note 2, at 1079-83; Twerski, Restructuring Assumption of Risk, supra note 2, at
13-14. Campo was reversed in Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 3S4
N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976); accord Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465. 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 629 (1970); Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, 3 Wash. App. 508, 476 P.2d 713 (1970). But see
Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An Analysis and A Survey of its Vitality, 29 Mercer L. Rev.
583, 604-09 (1978). For a discussion of a more recent case that seems to endorse the patent
danger rule as a factor in the multifactor dut" analysis, see text accompanying notes 192-94.
infra.
: See, e.g., Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 6 Cal. 2d 698,59 P.2d 100 (1936): McLaughlin v.
Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430, 2206 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962). The more
recent cases permit the jury to pass on the foreseeability issue. See, e.g., Balido v. Improved
Mach. Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1973); Comstock v. Ceneral Motors Corp.,
358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413. 290 A.2d 286
(1972).
9 See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.). cert. denied, 3S5 U.S.
836 (1966), rev'd., Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 109-10 (7th Cir. 1977). Liability
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the bystander rule' 0 have all but vanished as single factor no-duty tests
that immunize a defendant from liability. As a result, many commentators understandably have concluded that, with the disappearance of
single factor no-duty rules, the law has ordained that all design defect

litigation will proceed to trial on the issue of risk-utility balancing to
determine whether the product design was reasonable vel non. 1 Since
reasonableness is traditionally an issue for the jury, they have concluded that given prevailing attitudes, there will be minimal judicial

intervention in the form of directed verdicts for defendants in design
defect cases. 2 Armed with some poorly reasoned, if not outrageous,
appellate court decisions that read the role of the jury in design

litigation expansively,' 3 the business community has mounted a legislative assault on the common law of product liability.14 Their efforts
have met with considerable success. Many states have been prevailed
upon to pass legislation sharply limiting or curtailing the common law

for foreseeable misuse is now widely accepted. See, e.g., Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co., 265
Or. 300, 509 P.2d 28 (1973); Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 109 R.I. 176, 283 A.2d 255
(1971); General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977). See generally Noel,
Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 Vand.
L. Rev. 93, 96-100 (1972); Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging
Doctrine of Comparative Causation, 29 Mercer L. Rev. 403 (1978).
10 The rule prohibiting recovery to the innocent bystander under strict liability or warranty
had yet to be rejected as recently as 1964. Note, Strict Products Liability to tile Bystander: A
Study in Common Law Determinism, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 626 n.12 (1971); see, e.g., Mull v.
Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1966); Kuschy v. Norris, 25 Conn. Supp. 383, 206 A.2d
275 (1964). The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment o (19065)
specifically left open the question whether liability should flow to bystanders. U.C.C. § 2-318 as
originally enacted in most jurisdications extended only to members of the purchaser's family and
guests. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 106, § 2-318 (West 1958) (amended 1971, 1973,
1974); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 400.2-318 (Vernon 1965). In recent years courts have without exception
extended the strict liability tort action to the bystander. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors
Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co.,
257 N.W.2d 7 (Iowa 1977); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d
461 (1973); Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972).
11 See Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Beg. 62,714 (1979) [hereinafter MUPLA]; Epstein, Middle Ground, supra note 1, at 648-52; Henderson, Products Liability, 3 Corp.
L. Rev. 78, 81 (1980); Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 1, at 487-89.
12 Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 1, at 782-804; Hoenig & Goetz,
Crashworthy Automobiles, supra note 3, at 2.
13 See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980); Schuldis v. Service
Mach. Co., 448 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573
P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Azzarello v. Black Bros., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020
(1978).
14 See generally Buchanan, Product Liability Defenses Under the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act and State Legislation, 15 Forum 813 (1980); Twerski, Rebuilding the Citadel: The
Legislative Assault on the Common Law, 115 Trial 55 (Nov. 1979); Special Project: The Model
Uniform Product Liability Act, 46 J. Air L. & Com. 349 (1981).
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product liability action. 15 Although some of the legislation is sensible,
there is good reason to doubt both the efficacy and fairness of many of

the enactments.16
Despite this activity in the legislative arena, little attention has

been focused on directed verdict practice in the judicial theatre. There
seems to be an assumption that with the single factor no-duty rules
gone from the scene, a directed verdict for a defendant in a design
defect case signifies nothing more than a finding that under the facts
of the particular case "reasonable persons cannot differ." As such,

Is Many states have passed statutes of limitation for product liability actions. See, e.g., Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-551 (1982); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-577 (West Supp. 1982): Ca. Code
Ann. § 105-106(b)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1981); Ill.
Ann. Stat. ch. 83, § 22.2(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1966-1979); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-3 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1990); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.905
(1981); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13 (Cum. Supp. 1981); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp.
1981); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-103 (1980); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (1953).
Some states recognize a defense or create a rebuttable presumption of no defect if the
alleged defect results from a design that conformed to the state of the art at the time the product
was first designed or sold. E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (rebuttable presumption); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-4(b)(4) (Burns Cum. Supp. 19SO) (defense); Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 411.310(2) (Cum.Supp. 1980) (presumption); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:4
(Supp. 1979) (defense).
Several states recognize a defense or create a rebuttable presumption of no defect when
someone other than the defendant alters or modifies the product in a manner not reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant and the alteration or modification is the proximate cause of the
claimant's injury. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-683(2) (1982); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A4(b)(3) (Burns Cure. Supp. 1979) (defense); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.320(1), (2) (Cum. Supp. 1980)
(defense); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-3 (1979) (defense); N.D. Cent. Code § 28-01.1-04 (Supp. 1981)
(defense); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.915 (1979) (defense); R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-32 (Cum. Supp. 1981)
(defense); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-108 (1980) (defense); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-5 (1953)
(defense).
Several states recognize a defense or create a rebuttable presumption of no defect when the
design of the product or its method of manufacturing conforms to federal or state standards.
E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(b) (Cum. Supp. 1981) (rebuttable presumption); N.D. Cent.
Code § 28-01.1-05(3) (Supp. 1981) (rebuttable presumption); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-105(a),
(b) (1980) (defense); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3) (1953) (rebuttable presumption).
Finally, several states recognize a defense for unforeseeable misuse of the product. E.g.,

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-683(3) (1982); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-4(b)(l).(2) (Burns Cum.
Supp. 1979) (defense); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 99B-4 (1979) (defense).
,6Some of the statutes are particularly onerous. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-63(1)
(1982) (recognizing a defense if defect results from fabrication that conformed to the state of the
art at the time the product was first sold by defendant); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-20A-4(b)(4)
(Burns Cum. Supp. 1980) (recognizing state of the art defense if product was prepared in
conformity with the generally recognized state of the art at the time the product was designed);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507-D:3 (Supp. 1979) (recognizing defense of product alteration even if
product alteration is a concurrent cause). See generally Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or Retreat? A Response to the Product Liability Crisis, 14 Forum 251 (1978) [hereinafter, Birnbaum.
Reform or Retreat?]; Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability LawA Rush to Judgment, 28 Drake L. Rev. 221 (1978-1979) [hereinafter Twerski & Weinstein, A
Rush to Judgment]; Symposium on Products Liability Law: The Need for Statutory Reform. 56
N.C.L. Rev. 625 (1978).
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directed verdicts would scarcely be heartening to institutional defendants who want courts to address seriously the policy concerns affecting
the defendants' day-to-day decisionmaking.
Directed verdict practice in design litigation, however, is beginning to assume legally significant contours, a process this Article hopes
to advance. Courts are directing verdicts for defendants in appropriate cases because they have come to recognize the serious policy
implications of unwarranted plaintiffs' verdicts. The law is in a transitional state; the simplistic single factor no-duty rules clearly have been
relegated to history. At the same time, the full range of policy considerations bearing on the decision to remove a case from the reasonableness formula and the jury has yet to be clearly articulated. Still, the
rulemaking instinct of the American judiciary remains vigorous. Instead of focusing on single factor tests, courts have begun to identify a
host of factors with implications for important social policies, each of
which individually may not be sufficient to support a directed verdict,
but many of which in combination will dictate a directed verdict. Yet
many of these decisions, in truth policy-based with potential for valuable lawmaking, have been couched in the language traditionally
used by courts when they sit as super-juries addressing the reasonableness issue.1 7 This has hindered the lawmaking function of the courts.
With slight recasting and some interpretive license, it can be demonstrated that the courts in these cases are applying multifactor duty
tests. This Article proposes to identify the factors that have weighed
heavily in the decisional process, to clarify the policy considerations
underlying these factors, and to demonstrate how the courts have
combined these factors to reach the directed verdict or no-duty decision. This delineation of the actual behavior of the courts as it is now
evolving is intended to encourage the bench and bar to pursue this
new form of judicial rulemaking and to quicken the pace of judicial
activism in design defect cases.

The Ten-Factor Duty Test
Although in some instances courts have highlighted one factor or
another as the sole criterion for directing a verdict for a defendant,
typically it is a combination of considerations that lie behind a court's
determination that the defendant owed no duty to plaintiff. The
following ten factors lie at the core of such directed verdict decisions
in design defect cases.
17

For discussion of the "super-jury" concept, see note 22 and accompanying text Infra.
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(1) Polycentricity: Aspects of the product design may be related
in such a way that any design change would substantially affect the
cost, utility, safety, or esthetics of the product.
(2) Close risk-utility proof: The task of weighing and balancing
the product's potential for harm against its utility may be difficult or
impossible.
(3) State of the art: The alternative design may not be practically
feasible in light of the state of the art.
(4) Tenuous causation: The case for causation-in-fact may be
tenuous.
(5) Shifting duty: Independent and responsible decisionmakers
may have played a significant role in assessing and utilizing the allegedly hazardous product.
(6) Consumer choice: Consumers may have the option to purchase a similar product without the alleged safety hazard.
(7) Obviousness of danger: The hazard may be open and obvious
to the ordinary consumer.
(8) Cost: An alternative design could substantially raise the cost
of the product to the consumer.
(9) Design safety review process: The safety review process that
led to the formulation of the product's design may have been extensive.
(10) Legislation: The government may have played a role in
regulating the product's design.
Each of the ten factors raises vexing policy questions for a court
faced with the question whether to direct a verdict. As the policy
considerations accumulate and intensify, the probability that a court
will resolve the case for the defendant increases.
I
DuTy
An examination of the function of the concept of "duty" in tort
law is essential before the new duty analysis being used by courts in
product liability litigation can be discussed. In determining the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct, the jury in a tort action first sets
a hypothetical standard of care by deciding how a reasonable person
would have acted and then decides whether the defendant did in fact
breach the hypothetical standard. 8 Analytically antecedent to the
AN OvERvIv OF

"IRestatement (Second) of Torts § 328C (1965); L. Green, Judge and Jury (1930); James,
Functions of Judge and Jury in Negligence Cases, 58 Yale L.J. 667, 676, 65-89 (1949) [hereinafter James, Functions of Judge and Jury].
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question of standard of care and breach, however, is the question
whether the defendant was ever under any legal obligation to act

reasonably. 19 This initial "duty" question has traditionally been
within the province of the judge, and thus there existed a neat division

of labor between court and jury. Dean Prosser, addressing the question when courts will impose a duty of reasonable care stated frankly,
"[i]t should be understood at the outset that there is no magic in
'duty.' It is merely a word with which the court states its conclusion
that there is no liability; and it means whatever the court wants it to
mean in the particular case."'2 0 The creation of a general formula
governing the question whether to impose such a duty of care is highly
unlikely, according to Dean Prosser, because "considerations of social
policy vary depending on the precise issue before the court and social
2
policy questions always underlie the duty issue." '

In making a determination of no duty, then, the court performs a

distinctive role, grounded in its ability to respond judicially to important social policy considerations by making law accordingly. In contrast, the jury, in making its determination of reasonableness, is exercising its capacity for responding to the particular facts of the case
before it.

The dichotomy between policymaking and sensitive factfinding is
illustrated by a comparison of two categories of directed verdict deci-

sions. Decisions of the first category, in which courts have directed
verdicts on the standard of care using a risk-utility analysis, can be
characterized as low-level lawmaking.2 2 Whenever a court directs a

In most tort cases, the law imposes a duty of reasonable care on the defendant so that a jury
is required to undertake the two step process of setting the standard and then determining
whether it was breached. James, Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res Ipsa
Loquitur), 37 Va. L. Rev. 179, 180 (1951).
19Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328B(b) (1965); C. Gregory, H. Kalven & R. Epstein,
Cases and Materials on Torts 325 (3d ed. 1977); 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts §
18.8 (1956); W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 326 (4th ed. 1971); see James, Scope of Duty In
Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. L. Rev. 778 (1953). As Dean Prosser notes:
There are .. some defendants and some situations, as to which there is no such
duty. In other words, the defendant is under no legal obligation toward the plaintiff to act
with the care of a reasonable man, and he is not liable even though his conduct falls far
short of the standard, and the other is injured as a result. And this is true although the
danger is obvious, and the risk entirely unreasonable, considered merely as a risk.
W. Prosser, J. Wade & V. Schwartz, Cases and Materials on Torts 404 (6th ed. 1976).
20 W. Prosser, J. Wade & V. Schwartz, supra note 19, at 405.
21 Id.
2 While the simplest and most common function of the court in directed verdict practice Is
to evaluate risk-utility factors, it is useful to bear in mind the other tasks a court may be
performing when it directs a verdict. Courts may assume a supervisory role in assessing tle
adequacy of the evidence, a role which is not considered in the text. The court may find that the
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verdict it is exercising lawmaking power, but in cases of this category
the lawmaking is based solely on the facts of the case and the weighing
of risk-utility factors. A court might examine, for example, costs,
esthetics, safety, and function, and then decide that it would be
unreasonable to judge the product according to a particular (usually
high) standard of safety because the cost of a product meeting such a
standard would be exorbitant. In these cases there is no attempt to
classify the case according to the specific policy considerations being
evaluated, rather, the court functions much like a jury. Indeed, the
court sits as a super-jury declaring its view of the limits of the riskutility trade-off process.
Any screening of cases or precedential rulemaking that might
result from such a process is limited and incidental since the primary
goal is to decide the case at bar in such a manner that the vagaries of
erratic jury behavior do not result in an unjust verdict. Although a
directed verdict of this type has some precedential value, this is limited by the fact-sensitivity of risk-utility litigation. The next case may
differ in nuance and thus be distinguishable.
In the second category are verdicts on the standard of care
reached through a multifactor duty analysis. In contrast to directed
verdicts based on risk-utility analysis (the first category), directed
verdicts derived from the multifactor duty analysis can have an impact on future litigation. This approach may be characterized as highlevel lawmaking because, by clearly identifying the policy grounds for
removing the case from litigation or the consideration of the jury, the
court establishes principles for screening cases that should have significant precedential value.
Why, then, it may be asked, would a court employing such a
duty analysis ever permit a case to proceed beyond the pleading or
motion to dismiss stages? Although the policy issues should be apparent at the outset of the litigation, the court nevertheless may need a
plaintiff has failed to present evidence adequate to establish a fact essential to the hnposition of
liability. Should the evidence be such that, in the courts opinion, no reasonable person would
accept it as sufficient, the court will direct a verdict for the defendant. A verdict on the
sufficiency of the evidence is a statement that this particular plaintiff has not satisfied the burden
of production. C. McCormick, The Law of Evidence § 338 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
Determining the adequacy of evidence is a judicial function similar to deciding whether
there is sufficient doubt about a factual issue to warrant its submission to the jury. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328B(a) (1965). In short, though factual issues are within the jury's
province, the court retains power to direct a verdict on a factual issue if the eidence will not
allow the jury to reach more than one conclusion reasonably. See W. Prosser, The Law of Torts
§ 37 (4th ed. 1971). For a general discussion of directed verdict practice in the federal courts, see
Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 803
(1971).
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good bit of factual information before it is able to focus on the
appropriate policy concerns. This is not to suggest that the second

category of directed verdict cases are fact-bound, but to recognize that
a court can best address duty policy questions only with some knowledge of the facts. Once the decision whether to direct a verdict is made
on the basis of a multifactor duty analysis, however, it has the import
of law rather than the insignificance of simple factfinding.

Both the multifactor duty approach and the risk-utility calculus
require the court to balance, weigh, and interrelate factors, 23 and thus

at first blush the two tests may appear to be structurally indistinguishable. The multifactor process, like the negligence-reasonableness test
for tort liability, may appear too fact-sensitive to further effectively
the goals of certainty and predictability in duty rules. 24 If so, the
23 The general standard in negligence cases is one of reasonable care under the circumstances. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 (1965). In United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947), Judge Learned Hand articulated the principle that the question of
negligence requires a balancing of the magnitude of the risk created by the actor's conduct
against the utility of the actor's conduct. Judge Hand's balancing test is recognized as the
appropriate test for determining when an actor has been negligent. Restatement (Second) §§
291-293 (1965) provides a similar standard for determining whether conduct is unreasonable and
identifies the relevant factors for such a determination:
§ 291. Unreasonableness; How to Determine; Magnitude of Risk and Utility of Conduct
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm to
another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as
to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner In
which it is done.
§ 292. Factors Considered in Determining Utility of Actor's Conduct
In determining what the law regards as the utility of the actor's conduct for the purpose of
determining whether the actor is negligent, the following factors are important:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interest which is to be advanced or
protected by the conduct;
(b) the extent of the chance that this interest will be advanced or protected by the
particular course of conduct;
(c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be adequately advanced or protected by
another and less dangerous course of conduct.
§ 293. Factors Considered in Determining Magnitude of Risk
In determining the magnitude of the risk for the purpose of determining whether the actor
is negligent, the following factors are important:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are imperiled;
(b) the extent of the chance that the actor's conduct will cause an invasion of any interest
of the other or of one of a class of which the other is a member;
(c) the extent of the harm likely to be caused to the interests imperiled;
(d) the number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the risk takes effect In
harm.
For a discussion of the role of judge and jury in applying risk-utility analysis, see J. Henderson &
R. Pearson, The Torts Process 285-86 (1975) and Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 328B-328C
(1965).
24 For a discussion contrasting the uncertainty of the Wade risk-utility balancing test with
the predictability of the proposed mulitfactor duty analysis, see text accompanying notes 84-97
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proposed analysis would be of questionable aid to large manufacturerdefendants attempting to plan their affairs. As will be shown, however, this is not the case.
Despite the apparent similarities, five functions performed by a
court applying a multifactor duty analysis distinguish it both practically and philosophically from risk-utility balancing: (1) the court
identifies policy concerns that transcend the resolution of the case at
bar; (2) the court takes cases that it knows raise difficult policy issues
and places them, so to speak, in a "suspect category," thus ensuring
that these cases will be the object of "heightened" judicial scrutiny
before being permitted to go to the jury;5 (3) the court consciously
performs a screening function: at the pleading stage, the dispute is
removed from litigation entirely; at the directed verdict stage, the case
is screened from the reasonableness test; (4) the court decides the case
in light of a consideration of the precedential value of its decision;20
and (5) the court balances important policy considerations rather than
concentrating on weighing sensitive factual distinctions.
The significance of these five judicial functions-(1) policy identification, (2) categorization, (3) screening, (4) rulemaking, and (5)
balancing of policy issues-is that they are the hallmarks of the lawmaking function of a court. The risk-utility balancing approach, in
contrast, includes no attempt to categorize the problem; instead, there
is a visceral appeal to a sense of justice and fairness that distracts the
infra. For a discussion of the need for predictable duty rulings, see text accompanying notes 3638 & note 36 infra.
A famous example of the fact intensiveness of the reasonableness standard is the -stop, look,
and listen" rule. The fear that the reasonableness standard would not lead to the desired
predictability led Justice Holmes to attempt to increase the judicial role in determining negligence. In Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 70 (1927), Justice Holmes concluded as
a matter of law that a driver should always stop at a railroad crossing and under some
circumstances get out of the car to ascertain whether a train is coming. Holmes'attempt to create
a standard of care, as a matter of law, was later rejected unanimously in Pokora v. WVabash By.,
292 U.S. 98 (1934).
2 This term is borrowed from the lexicon of constitutional law's equal protection doctrine.
Just as certain legislative classifications of individuals automatically trigger heightened judicial
scrutiny, so should the presence of certain policy dilemmas in design defect cases call for special
categorization and a tougher standard of review.
216A decision by an appellate court on the standard of care question may have some precedential value. Moreover, an appellate court decision to affirm a jury verdict is, at the minimum,
authority for the proposition that under the facts of the particular case reasonable persons can
differ, thus affording some indication to courts that the standard of care in cases of that genre is
debatable. Such findings, however, are too fact-sensitive to be meaningful to persons and
institutions concerned with keeping their future conduct within legally secure bounds. This
Article classifies such findings as low-level lawmaking. See text accompanying note 22 supra. For
a discussion of the predictive value of the multifactor duty test see the application of the analysis
to some well known cases in the text accompanying notes 213-89 infra.
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court from its more valuable function of identifying the specific policy

considerations that should determine the outcome of the case.
In light of the distinctive roles of the judge and the jury-that of
policy-conscious lawmaking as opposed to fact-sensitive risk-utility
balancing-and the problems plaguing design defect adjudication,
judicial use of no-duty directed verdicts in this area is increasingly
appropriate and necessary.
Since the proposed multifactor duty analysis is designed to aid

courts in screening close-call design defect cases from the jury by
directing verdicts for defendants on the initial duty issue, it is instructive to examine certain areas of the law in which courts traditionally
have curtailed defendant liability by refusing to impose a duty of
reasonable care. Classic examples of such limited duty precepts are

rules immunizing defendants from liability in the following situations:
(a) negligent infliction of emotional distress;2 7 (b) failure to take affirmative action to assist others in distress; 2 and (c) landowners'
failure to take reasonable care to make premises safe for trespassers. 20

27 Recovery for emotional distress arising from negligent conduct is limited by fairly rigid

legal requirements. At one time, there could be no recovery unless the plaintiff's emotional
distress had been preceded by physical impact. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45
N.E. 354 (1896). The impact rule has since been abandoned by courts, see, e.g., Daley v.
LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84
(1970), but there is still considerable support for predicating recovery on a "physical result," that
is, something more than pure mental distress resulting from the defendant's negligent conduct.
See Sullivan v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1970); Daley v. LaCroix,
384 Mich. at 4, 12-13, 179 N.W.2d at 390, 395; Ver Hagen v. Gibbons, 47 Wis. 2d 220, 227, 177
N.W.2d 83, 86 (1970). Finally, many courts still refuse recovery for mental distress suffered as a
result of witnessing peril or harm to another person. The prototype of this case is that of tie
mother who witnesses her child being killed by a negligently driven car. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) is the leading pro-recovery case. Accord Corso v.
Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 406 A.2d 300 (1979); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979). A
significant number of jurisdictions refuse to extend recovery to the bystander. 'robin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Shelton v. Russell Pipe &
Foundry Co., 570 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. 1978); Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d 12
(1969).
See Bishop v. City of Chicago, 121 Ill. App. 2d 33, 257 N.E.2d 152 (1970); Yania v. Bigan,
397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, supra note 1, at 151-68.
But see Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 51 (1972); Weinrib,
The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 Yale L.J. 247 (1980) [hereinafter Weinrib, Duty to Rescue].
29 The traditional view is well set forth in James, Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties
Owed to Trespassers, 63 Yale L.J. 144 (1953). In a landmark case, Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.
2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), the California Supreme Court imposed a general
duty of reasonable care on the landowner, rejecting an approach that determined the standard of
care based on the category of the entrant (e.g., trespasser or invited licensee). Accord Mile High
Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971); Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H.
552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976); Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 354 N.E.2d 794, 387
N.Y.S.2d 55 (1976). While some courts have totally rejected the Rowland standard, see, e.g.,
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As in the design defect area, a variety of policy considerations

support the courts' grant of immunity: the desire to encourage and
protect activities that would be stifled if defendants were required

consistently to meet a reasonableness standard;30 the fear that courts
would be unable to separate fraudulent from just claims; 31 or the
belief that the law neither can effectively nor should regulate sensitive
32
interpersonal relationships.
Gerchberg v. Loney, 223 Kan. 446, 454, 576 P.2d 593, 600 (1978); Astleford v. Mflner Enterprises, Inc., 233 So. 2d 524 (Miss. 1970), others have retained the limited duty rule with regard
to trespassers, see, e.g., Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 (Me. 1979); Soule v.
Massachusetts Elec. Co., 390 N.E.2d 716 (Mass. 1979); Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 707
& n.7, 297 N.E.2d 43, 51 & n.7 (1973); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d
1 (1975) (dicta).
I* For example, good samaritan statutes provide that medical personnel who stop to render
emergency aid at the scene of an accident are not liable for civil damages unless grossly negligent.
See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-2891(a) (1980). For a complete list of the various statutes see 2 D.
Louisell & H. Williams, Medical Malpractice §§ 21.01.1-21.34 (1973 & Supp. 1931). These
statutes were intended to encourage the provision of treatment by medical practitioners, who
had come to fear malpractice actions. The need for and the efficacy of these statutes has been
questioned. See Comment, Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 Colum.
L. Rev. 1301, 1311 (1964); United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Report
of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice 15-16 (1973).
The most recent expressions of the principle that in order to encourage desirable conduct a
standard of liability more lenient than the "reasonableness" rule is necessary (thus creating
immunity from liability for negligence) are the first amendment cases protecting defendants
from libel actions when either public officials or public figures are involved. In this category of
cases, plaintiffs may recover only upon clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood
was made with knowledge of its falsity or with ruthless disregard of the truth. See Certz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964).
The landowner liability cases also evidence a concern that property owners will be too
heavily burdened by the imposition of a reasonableness standard. See, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's
Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97, 107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J., concurring): Wood v.
Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 330 Comment (h)(3) (1884).
31 Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935); Victorian Rys.
Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 225 (P.C. 1888). But ef. Tobin v. Crossman, 24 N.Y.2d
609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1959) (denying recovery to third party
bystander outside the zone of danger but emphasizing that fear of fraudulent claims was not the
reason for the decision).
32 The unwillingness of courts to recognize a duty to rescue has been justified on principles of
liberty and individual autonomy. See Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, supra note 1, at 6368. This point of view is thoroughly discussed in Weinrib, Duty to Rescue, supra note 28, at 25S68. The tort immunities surrounding family relationships are grounded on the reluctance of
courts to monitor relationships between husband and wife or parent and child. Thus, even after
decisions limiting or abolishing family immunity rules, see Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142
N.W.2d 66 (1966); Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529
(1969); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972); Coller v. White. 20 Wis. 2d
402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963), courts remain cautious in imposing liability when the Issue is the
proper conduct owed by family members to each other. See, e.g., Beaudette v. Frana, 285 MInn.
366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969) (court abolished an absolute spousal immunity, but remanded for
further fact finding); Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338. 384 N.Y.S.2d 859
(1974) (court stated that the reasonable person standard is not the -wisest" one to employ in the
context of family relationships).
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The late Dean Leon Green argued that a determination of the
duty issue "ultimately rests upon broad policies which underlie the
law. ' 33 He identified morality, economics, practical administration of
the law, and equity between the parties as policies that help shape
duty rules. 34 The value of courts explicitly recognizing the influence of
these factors in determining the content of duty rules is that thus the
process of judicial decisionmaking is thus rendered more open to
reasoned argument directly addressing these considerations. 35
While these broadly stated considerations may help the trial or
appellate judge confront the duty question with greater honesty, they
add little predictability to the outcome of that confrontation. The
need for predictable duty rulings is grounded in substantive tort policy
as well as more broadly based process values. 3 One substantive goal
underlying many of the no-duty rules is the encouragement of innovative action on the part of certain classes of defendants. 37 To the extent
that the rules are uncertain and subject to constant judicial erosion,
they will be less apt to bring about the desired objective. The threat of
liability may be as potent a deterrent as the actual liability itself. 8

3 Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 Tex. L. Rev. 42, 45 (1962). Dean Green,
one of the earliest exponents of a well-articulated duty analysis, urged that policy questions bo
brought front and center in tort litigation. For an overview of Dean Green's position, see Green,
The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 543 (1962); Green, Foresecability in Negligence Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1401 (1961); Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence
Cases (pts. I & 2), 28 Colum. L. Rev. 1014 (1928), 29 Colum. L. Rev. 255 (1929). For a more
recent expression of Green's view, see Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and
the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 Utah L. Rev. 1 (1977).
3 Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, supra note 33, at 45.
I Some of the leading tort cases of the last decade have addressed straightforwardly tile
policy factors behind the duty determination. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal.
3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Coulter v. Superior
Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728,
441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
36When a legal dispute, if litigated, is resolved through application of precise rules rather
than by reference to general, open-ended standards, it iseasier for the parties to predict tle
outcome. In turn, an increase in the predictability of the outcome of litigation will likely result In
a higher settlement rate. Because the costs of an out-of-court settlement are usually lower than
the costs of litigating, a higher settlement rate should result in a reduction of the total costs of
legal dispute resolution. Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J.
Legal Stud. 257, 265 (1974) [hereinafter Ehrlich & Posner, Economic Analysis]. For a discussion
of the beneficial effects of greater precision of legal obligations on legal system behavior, see Id.
at 264-71.
37 See note 30 supra.
38 Ehrlich and Posner argue that uncertain rules may impose heavy social costs by deterring
socially valuable conduct that is within the penumbra of the vague standard. Ehrlich & Posner,
Economic Analysis, supra note 36, at 262-64. Thus, primary behavior may be affected adversely
by rules that appear to have little stability. Certainly the possibility exists that the lack of formal
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Justiciability, a process concern, also requires specificity in the

no-duty rules governing liability. Professor Henderson has argued that
standard setting through use of the "reasonable man" doctrine entan-

gles the judiciary in polycentric litigation.39 He argues that in cases
where standard setting requires very complex technological analysis,

usually dependent on expert testimony, the controversy becomes nonjusticiable. 40 Courts have attempted to minimize the difficulties of
such litigation by formulating well-focused no-duty rules so that "the

issue for decision is not whether the defendant's conduct was reasonable under all the circumstances, but whether the requirements of
relatively specific, formal rules of decision are satisfied." 4'

Thus, courts already have identified some important policies that
support a judicial conclusion of no duty. Policies such as the encour-

agement or protection of certain primary conduct, predictability, and
justiciability are well accepted justifications for limiting defendant
liability in tort.

II
ANTECEDENTS OF MULTIFACTOR DuTy ANALYSIS

Areas of tort law in which the courts have demonstrated a willingness to direct policy-based no-duty verdicts provide antecedents for
rules in design litigation and the concomitant reliance on the -reasonableness" standard will lead
manufacturers to be excessively cautious in designing products.
9 Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 1, at 1534-42.
40 [Plolycentric problems are many-centered problems, in which each point for decision is
related to all the others as are the strands of a spider web. If one strand is pulled, a complex
pattern of readjustments will occur throughout the entire web. If another strand is pulled,
the relationships among all the strands will again be readjusted. A lawyer seeking to base
his argument upon established principle and required to address himself in discourse to
each of a dozen strands, or issues, would find his task frustratingly impossible. As he moved
from the first point of his argument to the second and then to the third, he would find his
arguments regarding the earlier points shifting beneath him.
Henderson, Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 1, at 1536.
Polycentric problems present themselves to the manufacturer as well as to the court. At the
preproduction phase of product design, a decision about one element of a design which is
inextricably related to decisions about other aspects of the design is a palycentric decision for the
manufacturer. Should a defect in one of these elements of the product become the subject of
litigation, the court will face problems of polycentric decisionmaking due to the nature of the
product and its design proems. While not all problems of polycentricity for courts stem from
products whose design was the result of polycentric decisionmaking, it is likely that most
products of this sort will create such problems should they become the subject of design defect
litigation.
For the background of the term "polycentricity," see Henderson, Judicial Review of Design
Choices, supra note 1, at 475 n.23.
4, Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 1, at 480. -These rules share
the functional characteristic of all common-law rules of liability-that of screening out polycentricity and rendering legal controversies adjudicative." Id.
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the proposed multifactor duty analysis. In several instances, courts
have abandoned single factor no-duty rules and, sensitive to the need
for greater specificity in formulating duty rules, have set forth in some
detail the factors considered in determining whether a duty of care
exists. 42 Although these cases are not exactly analogous to the structure
that will be proposed for duty decisions in product liability cases, they
do provide a backdrop for the analytical scheme that will be suggested.
A. Liability of Financierfor Negligence
of Developers
The California Supreme Court, in several landmark cases, has
attempted to identify factors that will aid courts in deciding whether
to impose on the defendant a duty of due care. In Connor v. Great
Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, 43 the court questioned the necessity of
privity of contract to impose a duty of reasonable care on a savings
and loan association that had financed a housing development project. The plaintiffs' homes had been seriously damaged by cracking
caused by poorly designed foundations that were unable to withstand
the expansion and contraction of adobe soil. The court set forth a sixfactor test to determine whether to impose a duty of due care upon the
defendant:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be
held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of various factors, among which are [1] the
extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff,
[2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [5] the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and [6] the
44
policy of preventing future harm.
The court examined each of the factors and found that the defendant
was clearly under a duty to the homeowners "to exercise reasonable
care to protect them from damages caused by major structural defects." 45

42 See text accompanying notes 43-65 infra.
43 69 Cal. 2d 850, 477 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968).

11 Id. at 865, 477 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (quoting Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d
647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958)).
'5 Id. at 866, 447 P.2d at 617, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
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Connor merits careful analysis. 4 The factors appear to be broad
enough to bolster most conclusions a court could reach. They appear
to provide little in the way of predictive value or guidance to a court
struggling with the problem of whether to grant the institutional
immunity created by the privity doctrine.
Despite legitimate skepticism about the utility of these factors,
the court's formulation is intriguing. An examination of the factors
reveals that several of them are identical either to factors in the riskutility (reasonableness) formula or to causation concepts. Risk foreseeability and moral blame, for example, are elements of the negligence
calculus. Certainty of injury and close connection between defendant's conduct and plaintiff's injury are elements of causation analysis.
What is the role of these factors in duty analysis? The Connor
court apparently believed that even before undertaking litigation that
would focus on these issues, there would be a judicial responsibility to
investigate in a more fundamental way whether foreseeability and
causation issues are sufficiently developed to be litigable. It also appears that, under the cumulative six-factor formula, issues such as
foreseeability and causation are to be balanced against each other in
the process of making the threshold duty decision, even though they
are treated separately at trial. These two aspects of the multifactor
duty formula have important implications for the newly developing
duty rules in the product liability area and will be discussed at length
47
later in this Article.

To summarize: The Connor court attempted a structured approach to a rather clearly focused duty issue, privity, and it did so in
part by screening some of the issues that would ultimately be litigated
and by relating them to each other. It is difficult, however, to quell
the suspicion that the factors are so general that they can be manipulated to achieve any result.

4' The literature has focused almost exclusively on the interesting substantive question of
lender liability for a developer's negligence. See, e.g., Levie, Security Interests in Chattel Paper.
78 Yale L.J. 935, 948-50 (1969); Note, Financing of Building Construction: Liability for Structural Defects, 10 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 932 (1969); see also Lathrop & Rinehart, Legal
Malpractice and Rule lOb-5 Liability: Pitfalls for the Occasional Securities Practitioner, 5 Loy.
L.A.L. Rev. 449, 465 (1972). Little attention has been given to the mode of analysis used by the
California court to reach its conclusion that a right-duty relationship e.xisted. In a sense, it is
understandable that the six-factor duty formula would be deemed unimportant. The court had
first established the culpability of the lender in dealing with undercapitalized and inexperienced
developers; the six-factor formula duplicated much of the earlier analysis.
4' See text accompanying notes 138-39; 146-58 infra.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:521

B. Duty to Bystanders to Avoid Negligent

Infliction of Emotional Harm
The famous case of Dillon v. Legg48 suggests a slightly different
mode of multifactor duty analysis. In Dillon, the California Supreme
Court decided that a negligent motorist was liable to a mother who
suffered emotional trauma and subsequent physical injury as a result
of witnessing the death of her child. The mother had not been in the
zone of danger herself. Prior to Dillon, the no-duty rule in California
prohibited recovery by a bystander who suffered injury as a result of
witnessing injury to another unless the plaintiff had been personally
49
within the zone of danger.
The Dillon court abandoned the no-duty rule for a more flexible
multifactor test, stating:
In determining. .

whether defendant owes plaintiff a duty of

due care, the courts will take into account such factors as the
following: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the
accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance
of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from
others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim
were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship.50
Dillon has received a mixed reception from courts and scholars.
It has been praised by some for its sense of fairness 5' and damned by
others for creating distinctions as arbitrary as those it sought to abol-

68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 302-03, 379 P.2d 513,
517, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 37 (1963), in which the court stated:
48
40

As a general rule, no recovery is permitted for a mental or emotional disturbance, or for a
bodily illness resulting therefrom, in the absence of a contemporaneous bodily contact or
independent cause of action, or an element of willfulness, wantonness, or maliciousness, In
cases in which there is no injury other than one to a third person, even though recovery
would have been permitted had the wrong been directed against the plaintiff.
Id. (quoting 52 Am. Jur., Torts § 70, at 417). Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d at 748, 441 P.2d at 925,
69 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
so Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal, 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (emphasis
added).
5' See Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury to
Another, 15 J. Fam. L. 163, 180 (1976-1977); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental DistressThe Case for an Independent Tort, 59 Geo. L.J. 1237, 1246 n.51 (1971); cases cited in note 27
supra.
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ish. It has been lauded for its flexibility 3 and denounced because the
flexibility of the multifactor approach reduces the formality of the
rules, thus requiring the courts to engage in polycentric decisionmaking.A decade after Dillon, it is now possible to assess the strengths
and weaknesses of the multifactor approach. The fear that the Dillon
factors were so flexible that they would provide little guidance for
courts has not been realized. In Justus v. Atchison,- the California
Supreme Court reviewed its own post-Dillon decisions and those of
the intermediate appellate courts. Of the eight decisions it found that
utilized the Dillon factors,56 three upheld a cause of action5 and five
reached a no-duty decision. 8

-' See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Sinn v.
Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 182-85, 404 A.2d 672, 690-92 (1979) (Roberts, J.,dissenting); D'Ambra v.
United States, 114 R.I. 643, 666, 338 A.2d 524, 535-36 (1975) (Joslin, J.,dissenting).
, See Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Between
California and New York, 51 St. John's L. Rev. 1, 10-11 (1976) [hereinafter Simons, Psychic
Injury and the Bystander]; Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress. 58 Calif. L.
Rev. 321, 326 (1970).
See Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 1, at 517-19.
19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
See id. at 582-84, 565 P.2d at 134-35, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10.
57 In Mobaldi v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720
(1976), a child convulsed and suffered irreversible brain damage in his foster mothes arms as a
result of an improper intravenous solution. The court upheld the mothers cause of action,
although she had not been aware of the defendant doctor's negligence. In Archibald v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969), a mother came upon her child's body
moments after an explosion. The court held that her emotional distress was contemporaneous
with the accident. In Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863
(1977), the court did not require actual visual observance of the impact itself as a basis for
recovery, but found that plaintiff's perception of his wife's death by way of his presence on the
scene and his awareness of the accident occurring at the very place he knew his wife to be
standing met the Dillon requirement of contemporaneous observance.
51 Recovery was denied in four of these cases because of the contemporaneous observance
requirement. In Deboe v. Horn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 221, 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1971) and Powers v.
Sissoev, 39 Cal. App. 3d 865, 114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974), the plaintiffs did not observe the injury
until after the victim had been taken to the hospital. In Arauz v. Gerhardt, 6S Cal. App. 3d 937,
137 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1977), the plaintiff observed the victim's injury at the scene of the accident,
but not until several minutes after the injury had ocurred. In Hair v. County of Monterey. 45
Cal. App. 3d 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1975), a child was injured during surgery. The mother
neither observed the surgery nor realized the extent of the harm until two days later. In the fifth
case, Jansen v. Children's Hosp. Medical Center, 31 Cal. App. 3d 22, 106 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1973),
the court denied recovery to a mother who witnessed the slow deterioration of her negligently
misdiagnosed child. The court held that Dillon contemplated a -sudden and brief event" causing
injury to the victim. Moreover, the injury-causing event, as opposed to the resultant Injury,
,must... be one which can be the subject of sensory perception.- To allow recovery for
witnessing the effect of a tortious act would create potentially infinite liability. Id. at 24, 106
Cal. Rptr. at 884-85.
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The predictive value of the Dillon factors in California seems
significant. If one approached the cases objectively, one could predict
fairly accurately how the court would rule. 59 The real problems with
the Dillon factors have stemmed from their narrow focus and their

failure to account for other policy considerations that should affect the
duty decision. Justus itself demonstrates the inadequacy of the Dillon
factors. In Justus, fathers present in the delivery room when their
wives gave birth sought to recover for shock resulting from witnessing
the delivery of a stillborn infant. The court denied recovery after
reviewing the Dillon factors and finding at least one of them wanting.
The court held that:
Dillon requires more than mere physical presence:
the shock
must also result from a "direct emotional impact" on the plaintiff
caused by "sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident." Here, although each plaintiff was in attendance at the death
of the fetus, that event was by its very nature hidden from his
contemporaneous perception: he could not see the injury to the
victim ....

60

Since Justus, the California Supreme Court has interpreted Dillon to allow recovery for
distress without physical manifestations. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916,
616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). The requisite relationship between the plaintiff and tie
primary victim has also been clarified somewhat by the court. See Drew v. Drake, 110 Cal. App.
3d 555, 168 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1980) (plaintiff could not recover for mental distress resulting from
witnessing an accident in which her male de facto spouse of three years was killed); Mobaldi v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 55 Cal. App. 3d 573, 127 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1976) (foster mother of
three-year old primary victim allowed to recover). See also Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawali 398,
520 P.2d 758 (1974), in which the Supreme Court of Hawaii noted the "strong ties among
members of the same extended family group" spanning several generations, which exist In
Hawaiian and Asian families, as well as the unique "cherished... principle of adoption"
perpetuated by Hawaiians since ancient times. Id. at 410-11, 520 P.2d at 766. Thus, the Hawaii
court found a Dillon recovery appropriate where plaintiff observed the death of his stepfather's
mother.
-1 See Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander, supra note 53, at 33-34. A brief examina.
tion of two cases that came to divergent conclusions will demonstrate the point. In Archibald v.
Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 255, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723, 725 (1969), "within moments" after a
child was seriously injured in an explosion his mother appeared on the scene and saw him
bleeding and maimed. Although the mother was not present at the scene of the accident, tile
shock she suffered was found to be sufficiently contemporaneous with the accident to permit
recovery under the Dillon factors. In sharp contrast is Powers v. Sissoev, 39 Cal, App. 3d 865,
114 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1974), in which the mother of a child injured in an automobile accident was
denied recovery. The mother, who had not witnessed the accident, first saw the child in the
hospital 30 to 60 minutes after the event. The court held that the mother's shock was not
contemporaneous with the accident, but arose from circumstances not materially different from
those experienced by every parent whose child has been injured in a nonobserved accident. Id. at
874, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
11Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 584, 565 P.2d 122, 135, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97. 110 (1977)
(citations omitted).
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The court explained that, in its view, Dillon presupposed that the

bystander was an involuntary witness to the accident. 0' The court
noted that a layman who voluntarily observes a surgical operation

must be prepared for the "possibility of unpleasant or even harrowing
experiences.

' 62

Dillon may have presupposed an involuntary observer.

It would have been more accurate, however, for the court to admit
that the Dillon factors inadequately addressed the issue of the observer's role in an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

It would appear that from a process standpoint, Dillon is only a
qualified success. 63 It delineated factors precise enough to make pre-

diction possible. By limiting those factors to the foreseeability issue,
however, the court excluded considerations that must affect the duty

decision. Some courts, to their credit, have not permitted Dillon to
straitjacket their thinking but have focused on the general methodol-

ogy suggested by its structure. 64 They have thus been able to suggest
additional considerations germane to a duty analysis. 0 5

61Id. at 585, 565 P.2d at 136, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 111.
62 Id.
6 See Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 1.at 517-19 (criticizing
Dillon as devoid of formal rules, thus necessitating decisionmaking on a case-by.case basis).
However, Henderson observes that the court was -flirting with disaster without actually con.
fronting it," id. at 519, since courts following Dillon have applied formal rules to limit liability.
64 See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). The plaintiffs sued, in
part, for damages for emotional distress resulting from the negligent flooding of their newly
constructed home.Though plaintiffs had intended to move into their new residence on the day of
the flooding, they were not near the house when the damage occurred. The ease does not specify
how soon they became aware of the damage. The court found a duty to refrain from negligent
infliction of mental distress and remanded the case to be decided on general tort principles of
reasonableness and foreseeability. While not adopting the Dillon limitations (indeed, application
of the Dillon criteria would probably have mandated a no-duty finding, as there appeared to be
an inadequate temporal, physical, and emotional relationship between the injury and the mental
distress), the court cited important policy reasons tending to limit liability to cases of serious
mental distress. Id. at 172-73, 472 P.2d at 520. See also Leong v. Takasakl, 55 Hawaii 398. 41113, 520 P.2d 758, 764-67 (1974). A Dillon-style limitation was adopted in Kelley v. Kokua Sales
& Supply, Ltd., 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673. The father and grandfather of the primary
victim, informed over the phone of the accident in Hawaii, brought an action for emotional
distress suffered in California. The court held that a duty is owed only to a plaintiff located
within a reasonable distance of the scene of the accident, measured by the foresecability of the
consequences to the defendant.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (19SO), after a
thorough analysis and approval of the Dillon requirements, added that the severity of the injury
causing the distress should also be considered. Id. at 99-100, 417 A.2d at 527-28. In D*Ambra v.
United States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1973), affd, 518 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1975). plaintiff
witnessed her daughter's injury in an automobile accident. The district court took the liberty of
anticipating Rhode Island's adoption of Dillon. Notably, the court added a fourth factor to the
duty analysis-the foreseeability of the plaintiffs proximity to the accident-and suggested a
five-factor test for this determination. The court found that although all Dillon requirements
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III
THE MIDDLE GROUND

These foregoing cases demonstrate that, with the passing of the
single factor no-duty rules, courts have not moved automatically to
total reliance upon the reasonableness standard in the hands of the
jury. They have instead struggled to establish a middle ground in
order to retain some control over an area greatly affecting, and affected by, large issues of social policy and thus demanding coherent
treatment. In order to evaluate the propriety of courts utilizing a
multifactor analysis to assume a more activist position on the duty

issue, it is useful to compare design defect litigation with other areas
of tort law in which risk-utility analysis often plays a crucial role in
determining liability. 6

were met, the presence of a 13-year-old boy's mother near her child was not reasonably
foreseeable, and thus defendant owed no duty to the mother. On appeal the First Circuit
certified to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island the question of extending liability past the zone of
danger. 114 R.I. 643, 338 A.2d 524 (1975). The Rhode Island court, replying affirmatively, did
not adopt the foreseeability doctrine, but instead engaged in a general policy analysis, touching
on moral, economic, and administrative factors similar to those recognized by Professor Green.
See Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, supra note 33, at 45. Characterizing its finding of
a duty as an "exception and not the rule," the court recognized that application of the zone of
danger rule in this case would "deny psychological reality." 114 R.I. at 657, 338 A.2d at 531. As
both the concurrence and dissent point out, the majority's opinion fails to set guidelines for this
cause of action.
65 There are other instances where the courts have made reference to a multifactor duty
analysis. In Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Gal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976), the court mentioned a broad range of factors in its policy analysis
supporting the imposition of a duty on a psychiatrist to warn a victim that a patient posed a
serious threat of danger. See also Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 4,13 P.2d 561, 564,
70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1978); Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 152-53,
577 P.2d 669, 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 539 (1978).
Yet another example of a multifactor duty analysis is the six-factor test for the Imposition of
strict liability for "abnormally dangerous" products under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520
(1977). Courts have used this test to determine whether certain categories of activities should be
subject to strict liability. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (storage of one billion gallons of phosphate slimes is abnormally dangerous activity);
Siegler v. Kuhlman, 81 Wash. 2d 448, 502 P.2d 1181 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973)
(transportation of gasoline on highway is abnormally dangerous activity). The Restatement
formulation is closely analogous to the structure of the test suggested in this Article for the
resolution of the duty question in product liability cases since the Restatement Imposes on the
court responsibility for making a policy decision through the use of clearly articulated policy
factors. Only one aspect differentiates the Restatement test from those identified In this Section
and from the proposed product liability multifactor test. The Restatement test for abnormally
dangerous activities is directed toward broad categories of activities (e.g., blasting, dynamiting,
transportation of highly flammable substances); the proposed multifactor test operates on a caseby-case basis.
m While the Restatement (Second) of Torts does advocate the use of risk-utility balancing to
determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, see note 70 supra, not all jurisdictions
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Commentators have identified a spectrum within the field of tort

litigation for the purpose of analyzing the appropriate roles of judge
and jury. 67 At one end of the spectrum are cases addressing the question whether a particular activity, such as crop dusting 8 or dynamiting, 69 should be treated under negligence or strict liability theory. In
such cases many courts perform a classic risk-utility analysis: To justify a strict liability standard the court must first conclude that, on the
whole, the societal benefits of the activity outweigh the risks. It must

then conclude that the activity is attended by a high likelihood of
serious, irreducible risk.7 0 Whether an activity is to be classified "abnormally dangerous" is a question solely for the court. It is purely a
matter of law whether crop dusting, blasting, or driving a gasoline
truck, for example, fall within that category.7 ' As such, the decision
has high visibility 72 and is not fact-sensitive.7 3 Instead, it is a policy

have adopted the approach. See Note, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnormally Dangerous, Ultrahazardous, or Absolute Nuisance?, 1978 Ariz. St. L.J. 99 (hereinafter
Note, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine].
See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 1,at 379
n.82; Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 83S-39 (1973)
[hereinafter Wade, On Strict Liability].
" See, e.g., Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829 (Okla. 1961); Loe v. Lenhard, 227 Or. 242. 362
P.2d 312 (1961); Langan v. Valicopters, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 855, 567 P.2d 218 (1977).
69 See Spano v. Perini Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 11, 250 N.E.2d 31, 302 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1969);
blasting ases colleted in Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 1017, 1017-27 (1974).
'0The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977) lists sbx factors to be considered when
determining whether a certain class of conduct should be classified as abnormally dangerous
activity:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage,
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on- and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
71 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 comment (1) (1977); see Langan v. Valicopters, Inc.,
88 Wash. 855, 861, 567 P.24d 218, 221 (1977); Loe v. Lenhard, 227 Or. 242, 249, 362 P.2d 312,
316 (1961).
72 A decision is "highly visible!' when the policy considerations underlying the final determination are identifiable and do not get lost in a morass of facts. Clear articulation of the policy
issues concerning the court together with a fully developed discussion of their role in the courts
decisionmaking will result in a highly visible decision. Decisions of this type contribute greatly to
predictability in the design defect area.
73 Wade, On Strict Liability, supra note 67, at 838; see note 65 supra. For a general
discussion of the policies supporting strict liability, see Fischer, Products Liability-Functionally
Imposed Strict Liability, 32 Okla. L. Rev. 93, 114-16 (1979) [hereinafter Fischer, Products
Liability]; Note, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine, supra note 66, at 104. For recent scholarly
efforts to identify policies justifying the abandonment of risk-utility balancing for ultrahazardous

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:521

decision that an entire class of activity should be removed from con74
sideration under the fault principle.
At the other end of the spectrum are negligence cases, in which
the plaintiff's basic contention is that the defendant's conduct at a
particular time and in particular circumstances was unreasonable.
The decision as to the reasonableness of the conduct is fact sensitive in
the extreme. It is in the power of a court to direct a verdict on the issue
of negligence either because reasonable persons could not differ on the
findings of fact 75 or because the standard necessary for the imposition

of liability is unrealistically high. 6 It is rare, however, that courts
intervene to make findings that conduct is or is not negligent as a
matter of law. 77 Trial courts are extremely reluctant to direct verdicts
on the standard of care issue, an attitude reinforced by78 decades of
appellate reversals of overly zealous trial court decisions.
Design defect cases based on risk-utility analysis lie near the
abnormally dangerous activity end of the spectrum with regard to the
appropriate role of judge and jury. 9 On the one hand, design defect
litigation is similar to negligence litigation in that it requires a factsensitive decision, that is, a decision referring to only one feature of
one product. On the other hand, design defect litigation ultimately is
concerned not with the conduct of a particular defendant on a particular day but with an entire product line.80
As such, design defect litigation might have implications for the
safety practices of an entire industry. The impact of a finding that a
product was defectively designed may cause the defendant to redesign

activities, see Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, supra note 1; Fletcher, Fairness and Utility,
supra note 1.
71 The Restatement test does not necessarily remove an entire class of activity without
qualification from consideration under a fault standard, for example, an activity may be
"abnormally dangerous" in some places but not in others. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 520(e) and comment j.
7 For a discussion of directed verdict practice, see note 22 supra. See also Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 328B(a), (d) (1965).
7' See James, Functions of Judge and Jury, supra note 18, at 676-78 ("A jury will not be
permitted to require a party to take a precaution which is clearly unreasonable.").
77 See note 24 supra. Whether conduct is negligent is typically an issue of fact for the jury.
For a general discussion of the respective functions of judge and jury in negligence cases, see J.
Henderson & R. Pearson, supra note 23, at 285-86.
7' See Pokora v. Wabash By. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1934); Toschi v. Christian, 24 Cal.
2d 354, 364, 149 P.2d 848, 851-52 (1944).
7' See Wade, On Strict Liability, supra note 67, at 838-39.
80 See generally Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect, supra note 1; Owen,
Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 681 (1980); Wade, Design
Defects, supra note 1. See also Fischer, Products Liability, supra note 73, at 104-09; Wade, On
Strict Liability, supra note 67, at 838.
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the product, thus raising the cost to consumers and removing a
cheaper, although perhaps acceptable, product from the marketplace.

Whether or not offensive collateral estoppel can preclude litigation of
other cases involving a similar defect,8 ' the practical effect is that the
defendant is vulnerable to suit by plaintiffs who will be encouraged by
a previous plaintiff's success. The exposure for a defendant is enormous.
From this perspective, design litigation bears a striking similarity
to litigation of the "abnormally dangerous" issue. 82 A finding of defect

"IOffensive collateral estoppel prevents a defendant from relitigating an issue decided
against the defendant in previous litigation with another party. Offensive collateral estoppel was
sanctioned by the Supreme Court for the federal courts in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore. 439
U.S. 322 (1979). Parklanerecognized, however, that a trial court should deny offensive estoppel
when "a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where... the application of
offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant." Id. at 331.
Parklane left open the question of whether state or federal law on offensive collateral
estoppel should be applied in diversity cases. Several federal courts have applied the federal
doctrine of collateral estoppel in diversity actions involving product liability. See, e.g., Hardy v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1360-61 (E.D. Tex. 19S1); Flatt v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836, 839 (E.D. Tex. 1980); Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp.,
485 F. Supp. 242, 245 (E.D. Tex. 1980). But see McCarty v. Johns-ManvIle Sales Corp., 502 F.
Supp. 335, 339 (S.D. Miss. 1980), holding that state law controls application of collateral
estoppel in diversity cases.
As this Article went to press, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Hardy v. JohnsManville Sales Corp., No. 81-2204, slip op. (July 26, 1982) (Hardy 1), reversing the district
court's opinion and denying plaintiffs the offensive use of collateral estoppel against asbestos
manufacturers on the basis of Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). One practical effect of the Fifth Circuit's opinion will
be to permit asbestos manufacturer-defendants to introduce evidence on the issues of the carcinogenie properties of asbestos, state of the art, and the adequacy of warnings.
Three months after Hardy II, a New York Court upheld the use of offensive collateral
estoppel against manufacturers of diethylstilbestrol (DES) in Kaufman v. Eli Lilly & Co..
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 29, 1982, at 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Special Term, Oct. 26, 1982). The Kaufman
court, applying state law, pointed to the nonexistence of any inconsistent DES verdicts in the
jurisdiction, id. at 8, col.2, as one basis for its decision. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit In Hardy 11.
in reversing the lower court, relied upon the fact that subsequent to Bordl, numerous verdicts
had been rendered in favor of defendants in asbestos litigation cases, slip op. at 3720. For a
recent discussion of Hardy II, see Birnbaum & Wrubel, Limits on Using Collateral Estoppel to
Streamline Asbestos Litigation, Natl L.J., Nov. 8, 1982, at 31, col. 1.
In Vincent v. Thompson, 50 A.D.2d 211, 221, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118, 128 (1975), offensive use
of collateral estoppel was denied because the issue of causation was substantially different from
that in the previous litigation. Nonetheless, the court intimated that given other facts It might
sanction the use of offensive collateral estoppel. Id. at 02 n.3. 377 N.Y.S.2d at 128 n.3: f.
Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 63 A.D.2d 11, 17, 407 N.Y.S.2d 196. 199, appeal dismissed. 46
N.Y.2d 731, 385 N.E.2d 1301, 413 N.Y.S.2d 374 (1978) (similar causation problems militate
against class action treatment in product liability action).
82 See Fischer, Products Liability, supra note 73, at 114-16, Wade, Design Defects, supra
note 1, at 573-75. See generally Twersld, Weinstein, Donaher & Pichler, Shifting Perspectives,
supra note 1, at 347, 379 n.82.
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can affect an entire industry by mandating safety features that might
have to be incorporated in all similar products. By allowing a single

case to go to the jury, the court may be signalling open season on
certain types of design defects.8 3 Since policy issues in design defect

cases might involve classifying a whole group of products as unsafe, a
design defect decision is different from the "individual" fact-sensitive
decision that is the essence of negligence litigation.

Courts should seriously consider the implications of all this before
sending the case to the jury. Judicial oversight ought to be more than
pro forma-not every design defect case should find its way to the

jury.
Dean Wade has recognized the tension in design defect litigation
between the traditional factfinding role of the jury and policy implications for large manufacturer-defendants, 4 and his analysis of the
proper role of the court in such litigation is superb. However, although he correctly argues that design litigation occupies an ideologi-

cal middle ground between the fact-sensitive negligence issues and the

83 If a court permitted a case like Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972), to reach a jury, one could expect reverberations in industries manufacturing similar products. In Metal Window, the court overturned a judgment for the plaintiff,
refusing to hold a manufacturer of glass doors liable for injuries suffered by a woman who
walked into the door believing it was open. The allegation of design defect suggested that such
doors should bear etchings that would signal the presence of a door. Id. at 357. But cf. Kemline
v. Simonds, 231 Cal. App. 2d 165, 41 Cal. Rptr. 653 (1964) (imposing liability for negligence on
home owner for injuries sustained by child social guest who ran into sliding glass door). If
products of such common use and esthetic value would have to be redesigned to account for a
remote chance of injury, there are countless changes that would have to be considered In similar
products. See note 191 and accompanying text infra.
81 In an action for negligence it is normally the function of the jury to determine whether the
defendant was negligent, subject, of course, to the authority of the judge to direct a verdict
for the defendant, if he finds that the jury could not reasonably find for the plaintiff. On
the other hand, in an action based on strict liability of the Rylands [Rylands v. Fletcher]
type, for an abnormally dangerous activity, the determination as to whether strict liability
will be imposed for the activity is held to be one for the judge, not the jury-for the reason
that the decision involves issues of general social policy. In the products cases the courts
seem not to have approached the problem in this fashion. Instead, they seem to have
assumed that strict products liability is like negligence in this respect, so that a plaintiff, In
order to recover, must convince the jury that the product was "defective" or "unreasonably
dangerous" or "not duly safe," or whatever test is used. This generally works quite
satisfactorily when the question is whether the product was unsafe because of an error In
the manufacturing process so that it was not in the condition in which it was intended to
be. The issue then seems more factual, of the kind the jury is accustomed to handling. The
difficulty comes when it is not just the singlearticle which is to be classed as unsafe because
something went wrong in the making of it, but a whole group or class or type which may
be unsafe because of the nature of the design. It is here that the policy issues become very
important and the factors which were enumerated above must be collected and carefully
weighed.
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broad-based, policy-oriented "abnormally dangerous activity" issue,
he has failed to provide a multifactor duty test to guide the courts in
their analysis of the policy issues implicated in design defect litigation.
To the cognoscenti of product liability law, that statement may
appear ludicrous. The most widely adopted test for unreasonable
danger is Dean Wade's. He has suggested that a court consider the
following factors in deciding whether to submit a case to the jury:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the
user and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will
cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the
same need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of
the product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the
use of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of
suitable warnings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading
the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability
insurance.8 5
A careful review of these factors indicates that they are an expanded version of the risk-utility factors that the Restatement of Torts
(Second) provides for the assessment of negligence cases." The factors
are tailored to meet the products situation but they remain primarily
risk-utility oriented. Though Wade has admonished the courts to be
sensitive to policy issues, his test does not help focus the policy discussion. The upshot is that a court focusing on the risk-utility factors can
do little more than the low-level lawmaking discussed earlier, 7 sitting
as a super-jury on the reasonableness issue. It is fair to conclude that
the Wade criteria have done much to increase the sophistication of
risk-utility analysis but little to further policy analysis.
Wade, On Strict Liability, supra note 67, at 838 (1973) (emphasis added; footnote omitted).

8 Id. at 837-38. The Wade factors have been widely accepted by the courts. See, e.g.,
Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 807, 395 A.2d 843, 846 (1978): Cepeda v.
Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 173-75, 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (1978): Roach v. Kononen.
269 Or. 457, 463-65, 525 P.2d 125, 128-29 (1974).
6 See note 23 supra.
87 See text following note 22 supra.
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Dean Wade's choice of some rather unfortunate examples to
demonstrate the use of his criteria in directed verdicts denigrates the
policy-making function of the courts. He suggests:
If a plaintiff sues the manufacturer of a butcher knife because he
cut his finger, on the sole ground that the knife was so sharp that it
was likely to cut human flesh, the court would probably take the
case out of the hands of the jury and not give it the opportunity to
find that the knife was unsafe. Similarly with an aspirin manufacturer, when an ordinary tablet stuck to the lining of the plaintiff's
stomach and caused a hemorrhage, or the manufacturer of the
Pasteur treatment for rabies, when there were untoward reactions.
The problem in these cases is likely to be called one of law and
decided by the court. Court control of jury action is more extensive
here than in the ordinary negligence action. 8
The difficulty with Dean Wade's examples is not that they are
inaccurate but rather that they are too simple. These cases so obviously demand a directed verdict for defendant that it would be hard
to find a dissenting view. Certainly the power of a court to limit
liability in design defect litigation is not limited to such obvious cases
of nondefect and is perhaps more necessary in the close-call, difficult
cases.
A more enlightening example of the court's role in directing
verdicts in close-call design defect cases can be found in Wilson v.
Piper Aircraft Corp.8 9 In Wilson, plaintiffs alleged that the airplane
crash in which their decedents died was caused by engine failure
resulting from carburetor icing and that the carburetor's susceptibility
to icing was inherent in the basic design of the engine.0 0
The court's reasoning in reversing the jury verdict for the plaintiffs is instructive. The court ruled that although there was ample
evidence to support each of the plaintiffs' allegations concerning the
design of the aircraft, the likelihood of this design contributing to
carburetor icing, and the causal connection between such icing and
the crash of the aircraft, the evidence was nonetheless insufficient to
support a jury finding that the airplane was "dangerously defective"

" Wade, On Strict Liability, supra note 67, at 838-39.
11 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978).
10 Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that (1) the aircraft was not equipped with an injection type
fuel system; (2) the carburetor was not so designed and equipped that it would provide a proper
fuel-air mixture under icing conditions; (3) the aircraft was not supplied with an adequate
carburetor heating system; and (4) the plane was not equipped with a carburetor heat gauge. Id.
at 63-64, 577 P.2d at 1324.
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in design. 91 The court based its decision primarily upon the impracticality of requiring all aircraft to be manufactured with fuel injection
engines in order to avoid the dangers of icing. The court noted that
eighty to ninety percent of comparable small aircraft were manufactured with carburetor rather than fuel injection engines and that the
plaintiffs had provided no evidence as to the effect of the proposed
design alternative on such matters as "cost, economy of operation,
maintenance requirements, over-all performance, and safety" of such
92
planes.
Wilson cannot be dismissed simply as a case in which the court
believed the quantum of evidence to be insufficient on the issue of
defective design. Plaintiffs had clearly introduced evidence that the
alternate design they were proposing was feasible. The fuel injection
engine was not an untested hypothetical design; it had been in actual
use and had apparently performed well. There is no question that it
did not present the danger of carburetor icing that the carburetor
engine exhibited. Why then did the court find the evidence insufficient to go to the jury on the issue of design defect?
The court averred that the case should have been withheld from
the jury because there was insufficient evidence on the cost effectiveness and overall performance of the fuel injected engine. 3 However,
in offering an alternative design to a court, it is virtually impossible to
present the kind of evidence that the court was professing to seek in
Wilson. In most design defect cases, the plaintiff's proposed alternative will be a new and relatively untested design which does not have
a track record on such matters as cost, overall performance, and
maintenance.
The Wilson court did, however, tip its hand, indicating that the
carbureted engine was extremely popular. 4 It was used widely and
considered safe by.FAA standards in spite of the icing problem. Such a
widely accepted design could not be held "defective" on evidence
showing only that an alternative design could eliminate a fairly remote danger, without some demonstration that the costs to society of
declaring the design defective were negligible.95
In short, Wilson demonstrates that courts can take their policymaking role very seriously. A court that perceives it is making an

91Id. at 65, 577 P.2d at 1325.
92 Id. at 69-70, 577 P.2d at 1327.
93 Id.
9 Id.
I- For a more complete analysis of Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., utilizing the authors
multifactor duty analysis, see text accompanying notes 254-65 infra.
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important policy decision by letting a design defect case go to a jury
will transcend the simple counting or balancing of the elements of a
risk-utility analysis in order to consider the overall social and economic impact of a possible jury finding of defect.
In the next Section, this Article shall examine in depth those
factors that, in isolation or in combination, tend to lead a court to
decide that there is no defect as a matter of law. Sometimes this
conclusion is expressed in a statement that there is "no duty" to make a
product as safe as the plaintiff demands, 9 while sometimes it is expressed in standard "directed verdict" language, leaving the impression that a court is doing nothing more than evaluating the evidence to
determine whether reasonable persons can differ.9 7 In truth, however,
such actions should be recognized as attempts by the courts to ride
very tight herd on design defect litigation.
IV
THE FACTORS IN DEPTH

Before turning to the ten factors comprising the multifactor test
proposed by this Article, it is necessary to ask why a court should be
influenced by a cluster of no-duty factors, when each standing alone
would not constitute grounds for a directed verdict. Early in this
piece, "duty" was identified as a code word indicating that the law
would not permit the "reasonableness" doctrine free reign throughout
the tort universe. 98 Courts have a significant lawmaking function to
perform in the design defect area of tort law. As factors militating
against imposition of liability accumulate, a court must decide at
what point this combination of factors renders the imposition of liability unwise. Thus, a case containing all ten factors would cry out for a
directed verdict even though each factor taken alone would not support such a result. By disregarding the cluster, a court would be
closing its eyes to the reality that the case encroached upon numerous
areas in which the law traditionally has favored entrepreneurial decisionmaking.
The question arises whether the proposed multifactor duty analysis does not raise many of the same problems presented by the Wade
risk-utility factors. 9 Does the multifactor analysis not present similar

'6 See, e.g., Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 261 F. Supp. 134, 135-36 (S.D. Ind. 1966)
(mem.); Mieher v. Brown, 54 111.2d 539, 544-45, 301 N.E.2d 307, 310 (1973); Robinson v. ReedPrentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 479-80, 403 N.E.2d 440, 442-43 (1980).
97 See, e.g., Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 99-103 (5th Cir. 1978).
98 See text accompanying notes 18-21 supra.
99 See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
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polycentricity problems? 00 Are the factors not so numerous that accurate prediction of results is unlikely?' 0 ' I believe that the clustering
phenomenon would not trigger polycentricity problems. Polycentric
litigation entangles a court in a never-ending circle of decisionmaking-a task particularly inappropriate for the judicial forum.' 02 The
factors of the proposed duty analysis do not present this difficulty. The
factors, while numerous, are not hopelessly interwoven. The fact that
a court will act in response to an accumulation of factors is not the
equivalent of moving the litigation into the nonjusticiable class. More
troubling is whether the multifactor approach can provide some certainty and predictability for manufacturers. Admittedly, the multifactor analysis is not a simple rule that ensures predictability.' 0 3 But
neither is it an open-ended reasonableness standard. Once courts begin using and articulating the multifactor analysis, its predictive value
will increase.
The factors break down into two major categories:1 04 (1) institutional limitations preventing courts from fairly litigating design defect
cases,105 and (2) problems stemming from the perception of courts that
alternative decisionmaking mechanisms exist for determining the appropriate level of product safety. 0 6 The two categories are closely
related, and some of the factors bridge both categories. The extent to
which a court relies on alternative decisionmaking mechanisms will
depend on its perception of its own ability to adjudicate fairly the case
before it. The converse is also true; a court's perception of the fairness
of its adjudication will depend on its opinion of alternative decisionmakers and whether their judgment is worthy of respect.
1. Polycentricity
The hallmark of a justiciable case is that the issues which comprise the claim may be separated and resolved in sequential fashion.
11"See text accompanying

notes 39-41 supra.

101 See text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.

102 See text accompanying notes 107-111 infra.
103 Certainty, or the ability to predict with some certainty the outcome of litigation, is an
important aspect of any judicial rule and has been called "a determinant of the efficiency of the
legal process." Erlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud.
257, 257 (1974); see text accompanying notes 36-38 supra.
104 1 am

indebted to my colleague, Professor James Henderson Jr., for his suggestion that the

ten factors be broken down into broad categories. Any errors in the implementation of his fine
suggestions are mine alone.
10sFactors falling within the category of institutional limitations include polycentricity, close
risk-utility proof, state of the art, and tenuous causation.
106 Factors included in the category of alternate decisionmaking mechanisms are shifting duty,
consumer choice, obviousness of danger, cost, the design safety review process, and legislation.
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Each party's claim is supported by proof and argument under estab-

lished legal rules which allegedly entitle that person to a favorable
result as of right. According to Professor Henderson, the distinguish-

ing characteristic of nonjusticiable cases is that the issues "are interrelated in such a way that sensible consideration of any issue, or ele-

ment, requires the simultaneous consideration of most, or all, of the
others.' 10 7 Adjudication "requires problems the various issues and
elements of which may be taken up in an orderly sequence,"1 08 and

thus is ill-suited to the resolution of polycentric, nonlinear problems.
Risk-utility analysis presupposes a balancing of costs, esthetics,
safety, and utility against potential for harm, a balancing that involves a court in the kind of interdependent analysis of elements that
renders a case nonjusticiable. The introduction of one change may
lead to the need for another, which in turn can affect the safety,
efficiency, or esthetics of still other aspects of the product. Absent

clear rules of law providing direction, the judicial system is unable to
deal with the multiplicity of issues in anything but an arbitrary man09
ner. 1
107 Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 1, at 471 (footnotes omitted).
In several highly influential articles, Professor Henderson argues that design defect litigation
embroils the courts in an effort to decide essentially nonjusticiable claims. See Henderson,
Judicial Review of Design Choices, supra note 1; Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 1, at 469-77; Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 1, at 77981.
108Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept, supra note 1, at 471.
109 It is not necessary to reexamine Professor Henderson's thesis in detail, as this has already
been done in another article. Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Use and Abuse of
Warnings, supra note 1, at 495-500, 524-40. But see Henderson, Design Defect Litigation
Revisited, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 541 (1976) (responding to the criticism contained in the previous
article). Despite our rebuttal of his views, I and my colleagues have acknowledged that he lits
identified a serious problem in products liability litigation. In Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher &
Piehler, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 1, we suggested an alternative approach to design
litigation that focuses on the process leading to a manufacturer's design decision rather than on
judicial standards for assessing the quality of a product's design itself, in part because of our
concern with the polycentric nature of product design litigation. This issue is explored further In
Henderson, Should a "Process Defense" Be Recognized in Product Design Cases?, 56 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 585 (1981), and Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, In Defense of Process, 56 N.Y. U.
L. Rev. 616 (1981). Numerous courts have taken Professor Henderson's thesis into consideration
in their decisionmaking. See, e.g., Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 999 (D.C. Cir.
1976); Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234, 241 & n.12 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Korli
v. Ford Motor Co., 69 Cal. App. 3d 115, 122, 137 Cal. Rptr. 828, 833 (1977) (opinion
withdrawn); Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 770, 795-96, 381 N.E.2d 715, 73435 (1978) (Jones, J., dissenting); Guilyot v. Del-Gulf Supply, Inc., 362 So. 2d 816, 819 n.1 (La.
Ct. App. 1978); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 83 Mich. App. 74, 79-81 & nn.1-4, 268 N.W.2d
291, 294 & nn.1-4 (1978); Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St. 2d 317, 326, 364 N.E.2d
267, 273 (1977); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497, 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)
(Tunk, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 567 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (also citing Henderson,
Renewed Judicial Controversy, supra note 1, at 818 n.13), rev'd, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

June 1982]

SEIZING THE AfIDDLE GROUND

Conscious design choice cases are typically highly polycentric,
but the degree of polycentricity may vary substantially from case to
case. Some cases involve the design of a small, insignificant part whose
alteration will affect little but the part itself."10 Others involve the
court in virtually redesigning an automobile or an airplane.' Litigation of the first type may be quite judicially manageable; litigation of
the second type may compromise the judicial process. Courts should
assess the "polycentricity quotient" based on the facts of each case. A
court may, at one extreme, disregard polycentricity and, at the other,
direct a verdict for defendant because of it. In the more commonly
encountered middle range, a court should accord polycentricity whatever weight it believes the factor deserves in considering it together
with the other duty factors.
2. Close Risk-Utility Proof
There is danger in using design litigation to establish product

safety standards. As noted earlier, the standards that emerge from
litigation may affect an entire product line or an entire industry.112
Standard-setting in litigation occurs in the context of a serious injury

to an individual. The tactics of litigation demand that the plaintiff
seek to establish a standard for product safety which would have

prevented the plaintiffs injury had the manufacturer complied with
it. If the plaintiff does not take this tack, the case will probably fail for

110See, e.g., Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 266-67 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 907 (1976) (strap-mounted fuel tank instead of flange-mounted variety would have prevented explosion upon collision); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322., 329-31, 154
N.W.2d 488, 494-96 (1967) (screw-on cap would have prevented scalding if vaporizer tipped
over); Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 119-20, 417 N.E.2d 545,547-48, 436 N.Y.S.2d
251,253-54 (1981) (addition of plastic insert in ball joint would have prevented wear); Phillips v.
Kimnwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 488-89, 525 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1974) (line of metal teeth could
have been installed in sanding machine at low cost to prevent regurgitation of odd-sized boards);
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 346-47 (Tem. 1977) (redesign of lack-out
lever on a carburetor would have prevented loss of control).
"I See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 954, 958-59 (3d Cir. 19S0), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981) (increasing second collision capability of automobile by adding 250300 pounds of steel to side structure of the car); Carst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 719, 484 P.2d 47, 52-60 (1971) (redesign of braking and hydraulic systems of 80-ton earth moving
equipment); Back v. Wickes Corp., 375 Mass. 633, 636-38, 378 N.E.2d 964, 967-68 (1978)
(relocating motor home fuel tank); McMullen v. Volkswagen of Am., 274 Or. 83, 85-86, 545
P.2d 117, 118-19 (1976) (redesign of automobile seats to prevent them from being disengaged
from anchorage tracks during collision); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 5S4 S.W.2d 844, 846
(Tex. 1979) (installing roll bar to protect passengers when vehicle overturns); Seattle First Nat'l
Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 146, 155, 542 P.2d 774,775, 780 (1975) (inadequate structural
integrity in front panel of microbus).
112 See text accompanying notes 80-83 supra.
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lack of sufficient proof of causation. 113 The plaintiff thus must attack
with pinpoint precision, suggesting the design change that would have
avoided this accident. This takes place after the fact, the jury having

full knowledge of the plaintiff's injuries. Defendant must then argue
to the jury that overall design considerations not implicated in the
instant case justify the defendant's design choice."

4

The defendant is

thus required to suggest accident scenarios other than the one before
the court that are potentially dangerous."

5

The defendant may also

argue that adoption of the alternate design would result in a reduction
of product utility." 6 The very structure of design litigation suggests
that the parties may never address the same issue. While the plaintiff
is focusing on the actual design utilized and the injury suffered, the

defendant is forced to discuss product risks and utility in general and
hypothetical terms. The opposing cases may pass each other as two
ships in the night.

Defendants correctly perceive that in this nonencounter they
tend to come out second best. Their arguments, although interesting,

113 See generally W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 103, at 672 (4th ed. 1971); Haragan v. Union
Oil Co., 312 F. Supp. 1392, 1395 (D. Alaska 1970); Stewart v. Von Solbrig Hosp., Inc., 24 11.
App. 3d 599, 603, 321 N.E.2d 428, 431-32 (1974); Midwestern V.W. Corp. v. Rlngley, 503
S.W.2d 745, 747 (Ky. 1973); Berkibile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 93-94, 97, 337
A.2d 893, 898, 900 (1975); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 604-06 (Tex. 1972).
But see Rivere v. Philco Corp., 349 So. 2d 971, 972 (La. Ct. App. 1977); Green, Strict Liability
Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 1185, 1197-1200 (1976).
' See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 958-59, 962 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981); Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7-8, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 575, 579 (1974).
's In an ironic twist, the defendant finds it necessary to defend the design choice on the basis
of hypothetical situations not presently before the court. The threshold test for causation Is the
sine qua non or but-for test. In order to establish causation under this standard plaintiff must
hypothesize the absence of negligent conduct (or a nondefective product) and then ask whether
the injury would have happened in any event. The formal requirement that plaintiff establish
the hypothetical but-for by the balance of probabilities has been honored as much In the breach
as in observance. See generally Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 50
(1956) [hereinafter Malone, Cause-In-Fact]. Leading scholars have perceived the unfairness of
forcing the plaintiff to establish liability by demonstrating what would have happened If what
happened had not occurred. See Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 Mich.
L. Rev. 543, 559-60 (1962); Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Detriment
Cause In Fact, 46 Tex. L. Rev. 423 (1968). In defending a design defect case, defendant attempts
to show that the design which caused the harm would be safer in other kinds of accidents and
that the alternative design offered by the plaintiff would be more dangerous in those hypothetical accidents. Whether a jury is ever able to make the transition between the case at bar and the
hypothetical situations is questionable. In any event, it is a burden under which defendants
labor.
"' See, e.g, Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 957 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 959 (1981); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071-73 (4th Cir. 1974);
Metal Window Prod. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355, 357-58 (Tex. Cir. App. 1972).
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are decidedly lacking in jury appeal. There is justifiable fear that
sensible, even prudent, design decisions may result in plaintiffs' verdicts. Defendants look to directed verdict practice to resolve this
problem.
One possible approach is that embodied in the proposed National
Product Liability Act, 11 7 which provides that a design alternative shall
not be adequate to establish a case for design defect unless it:
[e]ould have been adopted for use by the manufacturer without
causing increases in the costs associated with the manufacture,
distribution, or use of the product, or decreases in the marketability or utility of the product, unless such increases and decreases
when taken together are significantly outweighed by the added
safety benefits of such alternative formula or design.""
This proposal aims at clarifying the issue of the too-close-to-call design
defect case by demanding a directed verdict unless there is strong
evidence of an improper design choice." 9 Whatever the virtue of
establishing this test as an independent ground for granting a directed
verdict, it seems that when the proof on both sides of the risk-utility
scale is closely balanced, a court should be especially sensitive to other
no-duty policy factors that may be present. Considered together, they
may constitute grounds for a directed verdict.
It is important to note that polycentricity raises problems separate and apart from those raised by closely balanced proof. The
former implicates the ability of the courts to replicate the complex
process of product design. The latter questions the fairness of afterthe-fact decisions that condemn the design of an entire product line
based on an isolated injury when there is reason to believe that the
manufacturer's design decision was reasonable.
The closeness of proof factor also raises a process question that
goes, not to the institutional capability of courts to determine fairly
the reasonableness of design decisions, but rather to the ability of
juries to weigh fairly abstract risk-utility factors when the case before
them raises questions of safety in a much more focused setting. While
alternative methods of reducing the unfairness to defendants forced to
demonstrate a design's reasonableness in hypothetical situations may
117 National Product Liability Act, H.R. 5626, 96th Cong., 1st Sem. (1979). reprinted in
Product Liability: Legislative Hearings: Supplemental Hearings on H.R. 5626, H.R. 7000 Before
the Suboomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 340 (1980).

I1s Id. § 5(b)(3).

119 For a more complete discussion of this aspect of the legislation, see Twerski, Weinstein,
Donaher & Piehler, In Defense of Process, supra note 109, at 617 n.7.
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be posited, it is important not to lose sight of the inherent intractabil-

ity of the problem. The proof problem is substantial and cannot be
resolved by fine tuning the present system or by increasing evidentiary
burdens. 2 0 Unless fundamental changes are undertaken, courts must

acknowledge the problem and factor it into their consideration of
whether to grant a directed verdict.'12
3. State of the Art
In a large number of product liability cases the manufacturer-

defendant argues against the imposition of liability on the ground that
it has conformed with the "state of the art."1 22 The term "state of the

art" has been used to describe at least three different kinds of problems, each of which bears upon the duty question.
a. Proof of Practical Feasibility-Designdefect litigation ordinarily requires that a plaintiff suggest alternative designs or warnings

that would reduce potential risk without destroying the utility of the
product. 2 3 This typically requires expert testimony that the alternative design is practical. 124 The crucial concern is the quality of the
evidence supporting the viability of the alternative design. Is it sufficient that an expert testify to feasibility, or will the court demand that
feasibility be demonstrated through testing? Must the defendant supply evidence to the court that the alternative design is reproducible on

the assembly line or will expert testimony to that effect get the case to
the jury? Manufacturers contend that courts often permit plaintiffs to

120Even this author's proposals to shift the focus in products litigation from product quality to
the process of decisionmaking, discussed in Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Pichler, Shifting
Perspectives, supra note 1, do not fully resolve the problem identified in the text. Under that
proposal, if a process defense were established, litigation would proceed with the plaintiff
bearing a higher evidentiary burden. This would give the trial judge significant control over the
directed verdict; however, once a case went to trial, the problem would reappear.
212
For suggestions that could have a significant impact on the problem described In the text,
see Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law and
Technology, 12 Duq. L. Rev. 425, 458-62 (1974).
122 See generally Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69
Calif. L. Rev. 919 (1981) [hereinafter Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension]; O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art: Terminology, Practice and Reform, 11 Akron L.
Rev. 627 (1978) [hereinafter O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art]; Raleigh,
The "State of the Art" in Product Liability: A New Look at an Old Defense" 4 Ohio N.U.L. Roy,
249 (1977).
123 See authorities cited at note 113 supra.
2I See MUPLA, supra note 11, at § 107E; Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The
Technological Expert in Products Liability Litigation, 52 Tex. L. Rev. 1303, 1310-11 (1974)
[hereinafter Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert].
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establish a prima facie case on the basis of expert opinion without
requiring rigorous proof that the alternative designs are in fact practi12 5
cal.
An articulate spokesperson for the manufacturers has described
the problem:
In spite of their vagueness, most appellate pronouncements on the
subject are reasonable in principle; and trial judges may well think
they are following this moderate approach if they speak of the
importance of practicality, cost and marketability. But many unwittingly reverse the burden of proof and adopt a more radical
approach in practice, if not in theory, by permitting the verbal
ritual-unsupportedstatements of opinion by paid partisans-to
take the place of evidence concerning these practicallimitations. It
is understandable that courts are reluctant to involve themselves
more deeply in unfamiliar and time consuming technical matters.
Yet the application of legal principles to technology is the essence of
product litigation: the issues are difficult and important precisely
because they arise at the uneasy border between engineering, law
and public policy. The judge who attempts to separate those elements artificially may distort both legal and scientific principles,
and upset the balance among competing policy goals as well.1 21
The response of the courts has been mixed. Some appear to demand
that experts come in with more than mere hypothetical alternative
designs*127 Others, mindful of the factfinding role of the jury, have
refused to direct a verdict solely on the ground that they found plaintiff's expert testimony unconvincing.'°- Even these courts, however,
might be willing to consider that factor as part of a multifactor duty
analysis.1 2 9 For example, when an alternative design requires exten125 O'Donnell, Design Litigation and the State of the Art, supra note 122, at 646-53.

16 Id. at 628 (emphasis added).
127 E.g., Bunn v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 415 F. Supp. 286, 291 (W.D. Pa. 1976), afid, 556
F.2d 564 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Carst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan.
2, 20-21, 484 P.2d 47, 61-62 (1971); Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832, 836
(Wyo. 1974).
128 E.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976); Blohm v. Cardwell Mrg.
Co., 380 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1967); Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1. 116 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (1974).
2 The problem of the quality of evidence presented by experts is very different from that of
the difficulty of proof. The latter presents an institutional problem. While plaintiff can link
causation of the particular injury to the specific defect, defendant is required to defend the
design by setting forth general uses of the product in which the alternative design might be more
dangerous. As noted earlier, raising the level of the plaintiff's burden of proof may ameliorate
but will not resolve this institutional problem, which is endemic to design litigation. See text
accompanying notes 119-20 supra. The problem raised by the state of the art question can be
addressed by requiring greater verification of speculative epert opinions.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:52,1

sive alteration of many parts of the product,' 30 the risk-utility evidence
is closely balanced, and plaintiff's expert has offered no more than
speculative opinions as to the feasibility of the alternative design, a
court might justly direct a verdict for the defendant.
b. After-Acquired Knowledge and Technology-The shift to
strict liability in product cases 131 turned the emphasis from the conduct of the manufacturer to the quality of the product. 132 This princi-

ple was readily accepted in production or manufacturing defect cases
that held the manufacturer liable for a product which came off the
assembly line defective. 133 In design defect and failure to warn cases,
however, a sharp controversy has developed as to both the wisdom
and fairness of applying a true strict liability theory. Those favoring a
state of the art limitation contend that it is unjust to apply a riskutility analysis with the benefit of hindsight. 34 The opposing view is

that ascertaining the state of a defendant's knowledge at any given
point in time is exceedingly difficult. Such a requirement would deny
plaintiffs recovery merely because they are unable to pinpoint the
exact moment a risk or a technological advance should have become

known to the defendant. 135

130
131

See cases cited at note 111 supra.
Under the regime of negligence, a manufacturer was liable only for reasonably foreseeable

risks and for technology that could have been developed with the exercise of reasonable care.
Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729, 731 (1959); Rhoads v. Service Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp.
367, 374-75 (E.D. Ark. 1971); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 395 (1965).
112See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1962); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958
(1976); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
133 Under a strict liability theory, in production or manufacturing defect cases, liability
attached even though the manufacturer had exercised reasonable care in the choice of quality
control techniques. See, e.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955. See
also Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act-A Brief Overview, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 579,
584-87 (1980). Dean Wade has noted that the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts §
402A focused exclusively on manufacturing defect cases in formulating the strict liability standard. See Wade, On Strict Liability, supra note 67, at 830-31.
134 Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect, supra note 1, at 622; Henderson,
Coping with the Time Dimension, supra note 122 (hindsight approach to design defect litigation
unwise under sound economic analysis); see also Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F,2d
151, 156, 157 (4th Cir. 1978); Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1184-86 & n.24 (5th
Cir. 1971).
135 For discussion of the application of strict liability to both design and failure to warn cases,
see Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 St. Mary's L.J. 30 (1973); Wado, On
Strict Liability, supra note 67, at 831, 836-37, 842. Judicial approval for this position can be
found in Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1974); Suter v.
San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Phillips v. Kimwood
Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 494-97, 525 P.2d 1033, 1040-42 (1974).
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Each of these arguments has merit. 31A multifactor duty analysis
allows the state of the art to become part of the court's overall duty
consideration in design cases. The reality is that the "state of the art,"

when referring to newly acquired information, is not an ascertainable
Strict liability (a hindsight test) need not necessarily apply both to technological advances
and to postdistribution information concerning design hazards. See Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 435, 482-88 (1979); Twerski & Weinstein, A Rush
to Judgment, supra note 16, at 227. Indeed, Professor Henderson concludes that the WadeKeeton strict liability test advocates reliance on hindsight only in case of unknowable hazards.
Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension, supra note 122, at 929 & n.43.
136Several recent cases demonstrate that courts are in conflict on the issue of after-acquired
knowledge. In Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill.
2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980), suit was
brought against the manufacturer of Pitrocin (a uterine contraction-inducing drug) for failing to
warn that the drug was contraindicated when the fetus was in high station. The Issue was
whether in an action based on strict liability plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant
"knew or should have known" of the danger. In an opinion that defies logical analysis, the court
concluded that to "require knowledge to be alleged and proved" does not "infuse negligence
principles into strict liability." The court said:
We perceive that requiring a plaintiff to plead and prove that the defendant manufacturer
knew or should have known of the danger that caused the injury, and that the defendant
manufacturer failed to warn plaintiff of that danger, is a reasonable requirement, and one
which focuses on the nature of the product and on the adequacy of the warning, rather
than on the conduct of the manufacturer. The inquiry becomes whether the manufacturer,
because of the "present state of human knowledge" (Restatement (Second) of Torts see.
402A, comment k (1965)), knew or should have known of the danger presented by the use
or consumption of a product. Once it is established that knowledge existed in the industry
of the dangerous propensity of the manufacturers product, then the plaintiff must establish that the defendant did not warn, in an adequate manner, of the danger.
79 IMI.2d at 35, 402 N.E.2d at 198. See also id. at 38-44, 402 N.E.2d at 200.03 (Moran. J.,

dissenting).
In Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. 19S0), the court faced the
question whether it was appropriate to admit evidence of the feasibility of a safety kill switch on
a boat manufactured and sold several years before. It was undisputed that such safety switches
became feasible after the sale of the boat in question. In allowing defense testimony that focused
on feasibility at the time of manufacture the court said:
In cases involving strict liability for defective design, liability is determined by the
product's defective condition; there is no need to prove that the defendant's conduct was
negligent. Considerations such as the utility and risk of the product in question and the
feasibility of safer alternatives are presented according to the facts as they are proved to be,
not according to the defendants perceptions.
Id. at 749. See also Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales, Inc., 604 P.2d 1059 (Alaska 1980).
These cases are puzzling in that they appear to adopt a negligence standard while insisting
that they are faithful to strict liability theory. The courts' avowal in all three cases that the focus
is on the "state of the art" rather than on the "knowledge of the particular defendant' is
interesting but irrelevant: case law has long established that a manufacturer is held to the
standard of an expert in that particular industry. F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts 1541
(1956).
Perhaps these cases are best explained as positing a test of "scientific unknowabillty" as a
defense. The defendant's nonnegligene in not knowing of a technological development may not
preclude liability unless that absence of knowledge is attributed to the technological community
as a whole. Whatever the appropriate explanation for these cases, it is clear that they seek a
middle way between negligence and strict liability.
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fact. 137 Rather, the evidence on this question will place the issue
within a certain range. Courts should include the forseeability of
technological advances as a factor in their determination of the duty
question, but they should not become obsessed with it. 138 On one
hand, the lack of foreseeability certainly favors the argument against
the imposition of liability on the basis of technology acquired after the
product has been distributed. On the other hand, the court's reluctance to impose a duty in that situation might be overcome if the
alternative design did not create polycentric difficulties and the evidence of unreasonable risk were clear. Thus foreseeability should be
an element in the court's multifactor duty analysis, 13 although courts
continue to disagree about whether it should present a jury issue in a
strict liability case.
c. Changing Societal Standards-There is a third context in
which the "state of the art" terminology appears in design defect
litigation. In some cases it is quite clear that at the time the product
was designed there was available a practical alternative design that
would have enhanced the safety of the product and avoided the
injury. Yet the court may resist sending the case to the jury on the
issue of unreasonable danger simply because the reasonableness standard is ultimately a measure of societal acceptability, and society's
attitudes toward safety have changed drastically over the past two
decades. 140 Safety features that have become commonplace were simply not considered important fifteen or twenty years ago. When older
product designs are alleged to be defective, the defendant often argues
that the product met the state of the art at the time of manufacture.
This argument resembles the "custom" defense.' 4' The manufacturer
does not contend that the proposed alternative design was not technologically feasible. Rather, the argument is that society did not at that
time demand the level of safety suggested by the plaintiff in this case
137 See Henderson, Coping With the Time Dimension, supra note 122, at 921 n.2, 926 n.22;
Twerski & Weinstein, A Rush to Judgment, supra note 16, at 240.
138See Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 1401, 1417-18 (1961);
articles cited in note 33 supra.
131 Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, supra note 138, at 1421-22.
140 See Henderson, Coping with the Time Dimension, supra note 122, at 923-24, 959-63.
141 That defendant's conduct or product meets the industry custom is not technically a defense
to a tort action. Custom is relevant to, but not determinative of, the standard of care question.
W. Prosser, The Law of Torts 166-68 (4th ed. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 295A
comments b and c (1965). Nonetheless, as a practical matter custom is often introduced by the
defendant in defense of the allegedly negligent behavior. When there is no evidence to the
contrary, adherence to custom may be sufficient to support a directed verdict. Low v. Park Price
Co., 95 Idaho 91, 96-98, 503 P.2d 291, 298 (1972).
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and that the manufacturer could not have predicted current attitudes.
It is akin to the "custom" defense in that the defendant points to
socially accepted industry practices to justify its design decision. The
argument goes on to defend the industry practice on the ground that
manufacturers cannot be expected to set standards which are wholly
unrelated to consumer expectations and basic societal attitudes.
Bruce v. Martin-MariettaCorp.1 42 demonstrates the strength of
this argument. In Bruce, a Martin 404 airplane, first sold in 1952, was
chartered in 1970 by the Wichita State University football team. The
plane crashed into a mountain; seats in the passenger cabin broke
loose from their floor attachments and blocked the exit. More than
half the passengers were trapped in the airplane and died in the
ensuing fire. 143 Plaintiffs contended that the seats and seat fastenings
were not designed or manufactured to withstand a crash. They'submitted an affidavit from a recognized expert that airplane seats in
common use on the date of the accident would have remained in place
and not trapped the passengers in the burning aircraft. Thus, the
claim of a design defect was based on a design in use some seventeen
years after the date of sale of the aircraft. In upholding a summary
judgment verdict for the defendant, the Tenth Circuit said:
[T]here is 'general' agreement that to prove liability under § 402A
the plaintiff must show that the product was dangerous beyond the
expectation of the ordinary customer.... A consumer would not
expect a Model T to have the safety features which are incorporated in automobiles made today. The same expectation applies to
airplanes. Plaintiffs have not shown that the ordinary consumer
would expect a plane made in 1952 to have the safety features of
one made in 1970.' 44
It is difficult to discern when a court will decide that the changing societal standards factor alone is sufficient to dictate a directed
verdict. This much is clear, however: as the gap between present
expectations and past societal standards widens, judicial unease at
allowing the case to go to the jury will increase. 45 Juries have enough
difficulty dealing with the foreseeability problem; to expect them to
account for shifts in societal attitudes is unrealistic. This is a function
for the court.

142544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976).
13 Id. at 444.
144Id. at 447.
145 See Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 100-01, 104-05 (5th Cir. 1978):.
Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1182-85 (5th Cir. 1971).

Ward
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4. Tenuous Causation
A plaintiff must establish a factual nexus between defect and
injury in order to state a legally cognizable cause of action. 14 0 The test
for causation is most often stated in but-for terminology: 147 but for the
negligence of the defendant or the defect in the product, the plaintiff
would have suffered no harm. This need to hypothesize away the

negligence (or defect) in order to test causal connection has been the
subject of much academic debate. 148 The plaintiff bears the difficult
burden of establishing that the injury would not have occurred absent
the alleged negligence or defect. The quality of proof on the hypothetical question varies greatly from case to case. There is good evidence

that courts approach these cases with a healthy sense of realism and do
not hold plaintiffs strictly to their burden of proof. Many cases go

forward even when it is clear that but-for causation cannot be estab1 49
lished.
Where the causal link is too tenuous, however, courts deny plaintiffs the right to take the case to the jury. For example, at one time
courts tended to dismiss prenatal injury claims' 50 out of concern that
medical science was simply too primitive to establish causation.' 5 ' As

14'

See authorities cited in note 113 supra.

147 Id.

141See authorities cited in note 115 supra.
"I See Kirincich v. Standard Dredging Co., 112 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1940); Reynolds v. Texas &
Pac. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694 (1885); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205 N.W.2d
104 (1973); Malone, Cause-In-Fact, supra note 115, at 60. In product liability cases based on
claims of failure to warn, courts have helped plaintiffs overcome the difficult but-for burden by
positing a rebuttable presumption that the warning would have been heeded if given. See, e.g.,
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820 (Ind. 1975), rev'd on other grounds,
265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d 974 (1976); Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex.
1972). But cf. MUPLA, supra note 11, at § 104(c)(3) (MUPLA sets forth a basic causation link.
The claimant must show that if adequate warnings or instructions had been provided, the harm
would have been avoided.).
11 Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 568 (1926); Magnolia CocaCola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex, 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
,5" See Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to Prenatal Injuries, 110
U. Pa. L. Rev. 554 (1962); Note, Prenatal Injuries and the Puhl Case, 1962 Wis. L. Rev. 150
(1962). The clearest statement of this issue is found in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
O'Brien in Walker v. Great N. Ry. of Ire., 28 LR.Ir. 69, 81-82 (Q.B. 1891):
[T]here are instances in the law where rules of right are founded upon the Inherent and
inevitable difficulty or impossibility of proof. And it is easy to see on what a boundless sea
of speculation in evidence this new idea [to allow an action for prenatal injuries] would
launch us. What a field would be opened to extravagance of testimony, already great
enough-if Science could carry her lamp ..
into the unseen laboratory of nature-could
profess to reveal the causes and things that are hidden there-could trace a hair-lip [sic] to
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medical science in this field became more sophisticated, courts permit52
ted such cases to go forward.

A more recent example of this phenomenon is the unwillingness

of most courts to recognize the seat belt defense.

53 The issue

can really

no longer be whether the failure to wear a seat belt is unreasonable

conduct. The evidence is overwhelming that seat belts reduce injuries
in many car accidents.'5 What has troubled courts throughout the
country is the second step-the proof of causation. To what degree
does wearing a seat belt reduce injuries? Courts, aware that the
courtroom would become a theatre for highly speculative expert testi-

mony on that issue, have eschewed recognition of the defense.1's
Similarly, in "second collision" cases, 5 some courts have been
unwilling to shift to the defendant the burden of untangling first and
second collision damages and have insisted instead that plaintiff

clearly establish the second collision damages for which the manufac-

nervous shock, or a bunch of grapes on the face to the fright-could, in fact, make lusus
naturaethe same thing as lususscientiae. There may be a question of evidence, [plalntifgs
attorney] modestly put it; but the law may see such danger in that evidence, may have
such a suspicion of human ignorance and presumption, that it will not allow any question
of evidence to be entered into at all.
Id. at 81-82. See also Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926):
Bliss v. Passanesi, 326 Mass. 461, 95 N.E.2d 206 (1950); Magnolia Coca.Cola Bottling Co. v.
Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
1-' Compare Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) with Puhl v. Milwaukee
Auto. Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W.2d 163 (1959). Similar concerns are evident In actions
brought by infants for injuries inflicted upon the mother prior to the infant's conception. Courts
evince concern that medical science has not yet developed sufficiently to remove the case from
the realm of speculation. See generally Jorgenson v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 483 F.2d 237
(10th Cir. 1973); RIenslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill.
2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). Only
when it is well established medically that certain acts are likely to cause harm will courts
recognize an action for injury to a fetus occasioned by a preconception injury to the mother.
153 See, e.g., Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 242 So. 2d 666 (1970); Clark v. State, 28
Conn. Supp. 398, 264 A.2d 366 (1970); Romankewiz v. Black, 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d
606 (1969); Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Robinson v. Lewis, 254 Or. 52,
457 P.2d 483 (1969). See also Kircher, Seat Belt Defense-State of the Law, 53 Marq. L. Rev.
172 (1970).
I-" See generally Bowman, Practical Defense Problems-The Trial Lawyes View, 53 Marq.
L. Rev. 191, 195-97 (1972).
15 See, e.g., Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498,242 So. 2d 666 (1970); Lipscomb v.Diamlani,
226 A.2d 914 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967); Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d
1030 (1972). But see Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974).
For a full discussion of proof of causation problems see Twerski, From Defect to Cause to
Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 Marq. L. Rev. 297, 32629 & nn.80-81 (1977).
'5 The term "second collision" refers to the collision -of the passenger with the interior part of
the automobile" after the initial impact or collision. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
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turer is responsible.1 57 Courts have imposed this sometimes impossible
burden despite traditional tort law which shifts to the defendant the
burden of proof on damages in cases where harm caused by successive
tortfeasors is difficult to apportion. 58 The lesson is clear: when the
causation issue appears to be open-ended and unmanageable, it may
become a significant factor in a duty analysis. The courts have failed
to articulate the duty analysis with clarity, but the holdings speak
louder than the stated reasoning of the courts.
The role of causation in the proposed multifactor duty analysis
will be significant because failure to take causation problems into
account may result in the substitution of one nonjusticiable problem
for another. It is likely that courts will face more difficult causation
issues as they attempt to scale down the design demands of plaintiffs.
In a court sympathetic to plaintiffs, hypothetical alternative designs
could be tailored to fit the causation issue. Plaintiffs, with the benefit
of hindsight, could easily posit a design that would have avoided the
harm which had materialized. As judicial and legislative constraints
on design defect claims increase, however, courts will insist that alternative designs be more realistic; and real safety devices will never live
up to the extravagant claims made for hypothetical ones. Thus plaintiffs will be forced to meet a greater burden of proof on the causation
issue; they will have to demonstrate that a realistically feasible safety
design, with a safety potential lower than most of the designs that pass
muster under present litigation standards, would have averted the
harm. Courts must be conscious that their attempts to force plaintiffs
to establish design defects with clarity may not simplify the litigation
at all. The reformers may simply be trading too-close-to-call design
cases for too-close-to-call causation cases.
5. Shifting Duty
Considerable controversy in design defect litigation has centered
on whether a manufacturer can absolve itself of liability by asserting

157 The leading cases requiring plaintiff to establish the extent of second collision Injuries are:
Caiazzo v. VoIkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1981); Stonehocker v. General Motors
Corp., 587 F.2d 151 (4th Cir. 1978); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976). Contra Fox
v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978); Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41
Md. App. 579, 398 A.2d 490 (1979), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. General Motors Corp. v.
Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980).
I" See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B (1965). For an excellent discussion of the
authorities that support shifting the burden of proof to the defendant in cases of this type, see
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 744-47 (1976) (Rosenn, J., concurring); Note, Apportionment of
Damages in the "Second Collision" Case, 63 Va. L. Rev. 475 (1977).
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that its product was sold to a responsible third party who decided to
make use of it with full knowledge of its dangerous characteristics. 1 9
The classic situation involves the sale of industrial machinery to a
manufacturer who fails to install safety equipment, with resultant

injury to an employee. 16 0 In the ensuing litigation, the defendant
buyer inevitably contends that the manufacturer of the machine

should have installed the safety device prior to sale. The legal question
may focus on whether responsibility for guarding against a particular
danger should shift from the manufacturer to the buyer or user,' 0 ' or

it may be presented as a problem of proximate cause or of an interven162
ing superseding cause.
The shifting duty issue might appear at first blush to raise a single
factor duty question. Since the question is not whether the design is

defective but rather who should be charged with the duty of eliminating the danger, it does not seem to bring into the limelight many of the
factors discussed earlier.16 3 The issue of responsibility for setting a

standard, however, cannot easily be divorced from the evaluation of
the standard itself. If a manufacturer found a particular design deci-

sion to be a very close call, and a sophisticated buyer decided to
choose that manufacturer's product over a marginally safer competing

product, the shifting duty argument might appropriately be made. In
such cases, delegation of the safety decision to a knowledgeable deci-

sionmaker who is most familiar with the product's actual use and who
has a more precise sense than the manufacturer of potential safety

hazards may be justified.

159 See, e.g., Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384, 387-89 (3d Cir. 1978) (manufacturer
not liable when unaware of use to which product will be put); Pust v. Union Supply Co., 38
Colo. App. 435, 444-45, 561 P.2d 355, 363 (1977) (manufacturer may be liable for design defects
despite employer-buyer'i knowledge of safety hazards), rev'd on other grounds, 572 P.2d 148
(1977) (en bane), but aff'd in pertinent part, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978); Bexiga v. lavir
Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 410-11, 290 A.2d 281, 285-86 (1972) (manufacturer may be held liable
for not installing safety device).
' See, e.g., Balido v. Improved Mach. Co., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1972);
American Chain & Cable Co. v. Howell, 511 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
I'l See, e.g., Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1974); Robinson
v. Package Mach., Inc., 49 N.Y.2d 471,479-81,403 N.E.2d 440, 443-44, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 72022 (1980).
"2 See, e.g., Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 644-49, 105 Cal. Bptr.
890, 898-901 (1972) (buyer's negligence in adding safety device may be a superseding cause of
injury absolving manufacturer of liability); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 123
(Miss. 1966) (failure of builder to install safety device prescribed by manufacturer was an
intervening, sole proximate cause of damage).
163 However, the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 452 comment f (1965), enumerates a
number of factors relevant to the decision regarding transfer of control from one party to
another.
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The idea of permitting manufacturers to delegate evenly bal-

anced design safety decisions to sophisticated buyers should not be
controversial. There is little doubt, however, that this proposal will be

viewed with disdain by some. Courts have strained to uphold design
defect claims against manufacturers of heavy industrial machinery

even when the grounds for sustaining the action were questionable.'0 4
The perceived inadequacy of worker compensation recovery has created heavy pressure to sustain third party actions against manufacturers. In many instances, recovery is clearly justified. 0 5 In others, a
multifactor duty analysis should be used to protect manufacturers
from unwarranted liability."'

6. Consumer Choice
One factor courts appear to consider in deciding whether or not
to direct a verdict is the range of choice available to consumers

between competing products.16 7 When the competing products vary
in price and quality, courts are less willing to establish general product safety standards. 68

Judicial reluctance to enter the safety standard field when
healthy competition exists is not hard to explain. Ours is basically a
free market economy.16 9 Safety is one of many factors affecting price.

'0
See, e.g., Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 518 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974) (manufacturer liable due to inadequate warnings of danger if safety device not
used; misuse by owner-user no defense); cf. West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d
202 (Iowa 1972) (manufacturer liable where warning of danger due to improper use was given to
buyer, but not to ultimate user-plaintiff, who was injured due to improper use).
I"- See, e.g., Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629
(1970) (wrongful death action against manufacturer upheld; manufacturer should have been
aware of and corrected design defect caused by no rearview mirror); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg.
Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972) (manufacturer liable where safety device suitable for
every use to which machine might be put was not installed).
' If the system of worker compensation is inadequate, that problem should be confronted
directly, not resolved by forcing manufacturers to become the defendants of last resort In every
case where industrial safety is implicated.
187 See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071-73 & n.19 (4th Cir. 1974);
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 69-71 & n.5, 577 P.2d 1322, 1327.28 & n.5 (1978).
As these two cases show, courts are most apt to take this factor into consideration In cases
involving commonly and widely consumed items.
I" The language of the Fourth Circuit in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. has been
repeated frequently in design defect cases:
Of course, if an article can be made safer and the hazard of harm may be mitigated "by an
alternate design or device at no substantial increase in price," then the manufacturer has a
duty to adopt such a design but a Cadillac may be expected to include more In the way of
both conveniences and "crashworthiness" than the economy car.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1371-72 (E.D. Va. 1978).
169See generally M. Friedman, Why I'll Die a Capitalist (1979).
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When consumers have the opportunity to choose among competing
products, their choices, as reflected in the market, tell us much about
the societal acceptability of a particular product. If the suggested
alternative design is only marginally better than the design that
caused the injury, it may be preferable to defer to the marketplace for
standard setting on the theory that in a competitive market the consumer is free to purchase whatever degree of product safety is desired.
But the existence of consumer choice cannot constitute the sole
ground for denying liability. Consumer choice may not be very meaningful, for example, where the design defect is not obvious or the
manufacturer has failed to give adequate warnings. Moreover, the
value of an opportunity to choose is substantially undermined when
the consumer does not know that safety features ought to be a factor
70
in that choice.
Despite its limitations, the range of consumer choice ought to be
a significant component in the courtes decision as to whether a manufacturer is under a duty to use or not to use a certain design. One of
the important functions of tort law is to deter only unacceptablesocial
behavior. When the market for a product offers consumers a choice of
design as well as price, it may be undesirable for the courts to set
design safety standards. 7 1 The consequence of judicial standard setting in truly competitive markets could be the deterrence of manufacturing behavior that, judging from buying patterns, society deems
acceptable. On one hand, such deterrence is not justified by a minimal gain in product safety. On the other hand, the mere existence of
choice will not justify a holding for the manufacturer. It is a factor,
however, that should be weighed by a court in making a directed
verdict decision.
7. Obviousness of Danger
For many years the patent danger rule operated as a single factor
no-duty rule in products liability cases, 172 providing that if the danger

170 "[P]erhaps even in instances where information as to product design is available, this
argument [about the value of consumer choice] may attribute to most consumers a higher degree
of awareness and sophistication than is realistic." Recent Cases-Torts, 80 Hare. L. Rev. 683, 691

(1967).
171 One commentator has suggested that the impetus behind the Seventh Circuits no-duty
decision in the landmark case of Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (1966), may have
been the availability of other car models which were advertised as offering more protective
frames. Recent Cases-Torts, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 688, 691 & n.18 (1967.
172 See generally Darling, The Patent Danger Rule: An Analysis and a Survey of its Vitality,
29 Mercer L. Rev. 583 (1978) [hereinafter Darling, The Patent Danger Rule]; Marschall,

Obvious Wrong, supra note 2; Twerski, Restructuring Assumption Of Risk, supra note 2.
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created by the defective design was open and obvious, the manufacturer would not be held liable. 173 As a New York court noted in
Campo v. Scofield:
The cases establish that the manufacturer of a machine or any
other article, dangerous because of the way in which it functions,
and patently so, owes to those who use it a duty merely to make it
free from latent defects and concealed dangers. Accordingly, if a
remote user sues a manufacturer of an article for injuries suffered,
he must allege and prove the existence of
a latent defect or a danger
74
not known to plaintiff or other users.1

The New York Court of Appeals overruled Campo in the landmark case of Micallef v. Miehle Co.,' 1 5 and now takes the position
that a manufacturer will not automatically be excused from liability
because the danger created by its product is patent. Instead, the court

requires a risk-utility analysis in design defect cases to determine
whether the product is reasonably safe. 7 8 Although many courts now
apply a rule similar to that of Micallef, 177 a significant number of
courts continue to absolve manufacturers of responsibility for damage
caused by obviously dangerous products on the ground that the product meets the ordinary consumer's expectations. 178 This emphasis on
consumer expectation amounts to a backhand endorsement of the
7
patent danger doctrine. 0
It would appear that the three policy justifications that gave the
patent danger doctrine such vitality in the past are not sufficient to
support its application as a single factor no-duty rule. They do, how173Blankenship v. Morrison Mach. Co., 255 Md. 241, 245-46, 257 A.2d 430, 432-33 (1969);
Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 471-75, 95 N.E.2d 802, 803-05 (1950); 2 F. Harper & F.
James, Torts § 28.5 (1956).
174Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 471, 95 N.E.2d 802, 803 (1950).
17539 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976).
176 Id. at 385-86, 348 N.E.2d at 577-78, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 120-21.
177See Mitchell v. Fruehauf Corp., 568 F.2d 1139, 1143 (5th Cir. 1978); Pike v. Frank G.
Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 473-74, 467 P.2d 229, 234-35, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 634-35 (1970);
Auburn Mach. Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167, 1169-72 (Fla. 1979); loth v. City Tank
Corp., 376 Mass. 874, 881, 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192-93 (1978).
178 Hartman v. Miller Hydro Co., 499 F.2d 191, 194 (10th Cir. 1974) (product not unreasonably dangerous if dangerous only to the extent expected by ordinary consumer); Vineyard v.
Empire Mach. Co., 119 Ariz. 502, 505-06, 581 P.2d 1152, 1155-56 (Ct. App. 1978) (lack of
rollbar obvious danger to an ordinary consumer); Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 147-48,
560 P.2d 934, 938-39 (1977) (manufacturer under no duty to warn of dangers actually known to
ordinary consumers); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d
326, 333, 230 N.W.2d 794, 798-99 (1975) (average consumer should be aware of danger of small
infant climbing into pool; manufacturer not liable for failure to provide locking gate).
'70 See Darling, The Patent Danger Rule, supra note 172, at 598-99; Donaher, Plehler,
Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert, supra note 124, at 1304.
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ever, warrant consideration by a court using a multifactor duty analysis. The first reason for the doctrine was a belief that if the danger was
obvious, the likelihood of an accident occuring was lowered. 1" When
this is factored into the risk-utility analysis of patent danger cases, one
of the variables-the probability of harm-is diminished, making it
more likely that the negligence or standard of care question will be
decided in favor of the manufacturer.
This in itself is not objectionable. Problems arise when a court
focuses solely on the hypothesized connections between the patency of
the danger and the probability that the product will cause harm,
while losing sight of the other variables comprising a proper riskutility analysis. In attacking judicial reliance on the patent danger
doctrine, one writer has argued:
[T]he patent danger rule flies in the face of the calculus of risk

analysis by insulating defendants with the per se position that
obvious flaws are not actionable. Obviousness of danger, which
should be but one factor in determining foreseeability and reasonableness of risk, becomes the factor in determining whether defendants conduct is actionable. The position that a risk is automatically
reasonable by virtue of being obvious is indefensible under ordi-

nary negligence analysis."
Patent danger is not the functional equivalent of reasonableness and
clearly does not merit recognition as a single factor no-duty rule. It is

less clear, however, that it is misplaced in a multifactor context. As
noted earlier, courts applying a multifactor test identify certain categories of cases as suspect and warranting careful scrutiny before they
are permitted to go to the jury. 82- If courts are concerned about
permitting design defect cases to go to a jury when the standard of
care question is closely balanced, as it is in obvious danger/low probability of harm cases, they should flag cases of this type as suspect and
scrutinize them accordingly.
A second rationale advanced in support of the patent danger rule
is that, when the danger is obvious, recovery normally would be
barred by the defense afforded the manufacturer under the assumption of risk doctrine.18 3 According to this doctrine, the defendant must
160Dorsey v. Yoder

Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd mem., 474 F.2d 1339

(3d Cir. 1973). See also Darling, The Patent Danger Rule, supra note 172 , at 5SS.
1 Darling, The Patent Danger Rule, supra note 172, at 5889. See also 2 F. Harper & F.
James, The Law of Torts § 28.5 (1956).
1-2

See text accompanying note 25 supra.

,'3 See Rheingold, The Expanding Liability Of The Product Supplier: A Primer, 2 Hofstra L.

Rev. 521, 541 (1974). Where defendant's duty was limited to warning about, rather than

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 57:521

establish that the particular plaintiff had actual knowledge of the
risk; 184 the presence of an "obvious" danger does not mean that this
particular plaintiff was aware of the risks although it is a factor to
consider in relation to the degree of care exercised by the plaintiff.'",
Under the patent danger rule, the plaintiffs ability to perceive the risk
and capacity to avoid the danger are not even legitimate issues. Children and bystanders, as a matter of law incapable of assuming risks,
have been denied recovery through operation of the patent danger
rule.186
One explanation for judicial reliance on the patent danger rule to
serve the policy underlying the assumption of the risk defense is the
belief that juries should not be trusted to decide whether a plaintiff
had actual knowledge of the danger.18 7 A jury aware that its decision

could result in a denial of relief to a seriously injured plaintiff might
be inclined to reach its conclusion without careful consideration of the
evidence. Thus, if a danger is truly obvious, the court will find there
has been an assumption of risk as a matter of law through application
of the patent danger rule.188
eradicating, dangers there was substantial support for the view that the assumption of risk
doctrine should not be recognized as a separate defense. See James, Assumption of Risk- Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 Yale L.J. 185, 185-89 (1968). It was only when the scope of duties
expanded to impose a full duty of reasonable care on a manufacturer of chattels that serious

concern arose as to whether the assumption of risk doctrine caused substantial harm to chattel
users. See id. at 191-92 & n.29.
181Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008, 1014-16 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
932 (1974); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); Restatement
(Second) of Torts, § 402A comment n, § 496D comments b and c (1965).
18' See Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 765-66 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd mein., 474 F.2d
1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387, 348 N.E.2d 571, 578, 384
N.Y.S.2d 115, 122 (1976).
'I'
See Stovall & Co. v. Tate, 124 Ga. App. 605, 609-10, 613-14, 184 S.E.2d 834, 837-38, 840
(1971) (recovery denied to child injured by rock thrown by lawn mower; absence of safety
guard, and hazard posed by this, were obvious); Murphy v. Cory Pump & Supply Co., 47 I11.
App. 2d 382, 393, 401-02, 197 N.E.2d 849, 854, 858 (1964) (recovery denied to seven-year-old
injured by lawn mower where absence of safety guard was an obvious danger); Meyer v. Gehli,
36 N.Y.2d 760, 761-66, 329 N.E.2d 666, 667-69, 368 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835-38 (1975) (Fuchsberg,
J., dissenting) (criticizing injustice of majority's application of patent danger defense to defeat
negligence claim arising out of six-year-old child's injury by farm machinery).
111Professor Keeton has suggested that the primary reason for the limited duty concept
prohibiting recovery from landowners for injuries arising from open and obvious dangers Is the
well-known sympathy of juries for injured plaintiffs, who tend to impose liability on defendants
even when the law may not support such a result. Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting From
Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 629, 641-42 (1952). Under this rationale, In
order to insure that a landowner's duty is limited to warning of hazards, plaintiffs would be
denied recovery in all situations in which the danger is obvious, thus avoiding the question of
whether any particular plaintiff was truthful in denying his cognizance of the danger.
11"It is difficult to assess whether this aspect of the patent danger doctrine should continue to
have effect in the context of the multifactor duty test. In jurisdictions such as Colorado where
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The final and most significant policy underlying the patent danger doctrine is doubt about the propriety of courts mandating any
level of safety when it is clear that the defendant has honestly marketed the product with adequate warning of the risks.169 Where the
assumption of risk may act as a complete bar to a strict product liability claim, sce, e.g., Kinard

v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 557, 553 P.2d 835, 837 (1976) (if defendant can show user
voluntarily and unreasonably encountered known danger arising from defect, recovery under
§ 402A may be barred), courts still might be concerned that the defense will be ignored by overly
sympathetic juries. They might then take the patentness of the danger into consideration on the
duty issue to ensure that the affirmative defense is duly considered.
In those jurisdictions that have opted for comparative fault and have merged contributory
negligence and assumption of risk into one affirmative defense, see, e.g., Daly v. Ceneral Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 735-36, 742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167-68, 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 3S0, 353-85.
390 (1978); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 810-11, 395 A.2d 843, 848-49
(1978), it is less likely that courts will use the obviousness of the danger to assure that proper
consideration be given to plaintiff's conduct. When juries are asked to return a comparative
verdict, they are presumably aware that the plaintiff's recovery will be reduced in proportion to
the plaintiff's negligence. Courts can leave the correct apportionment to the good sense of juries.
It is possible that in a -pure comparative fault" jurisdiction. e.g.. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§ 1411
(McKinney 1976); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 9-204, 4.1 (Supp. 1981). if a court suspects that a jury
may find a high percentage of plaintiff fault but still hold the defendant liable to some extent, it
may use the patent danger doctrine to prevent unjust defendant liability. But since defendant's
exposure is potentially much smaller, courts probably will not be concerned with the duty
problem. In jurisdictions requiring that in order to recover, plaintiffs fault be less than the fault
of the defendant, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 156 (1964). Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604.01
(West Supp. 1982), it is still very likely that a court, convinced that plaintiff's fault is the greater
but sensing that the jury may return a 5149% verdict for plaintiff, will direct a verdict for
defendant based upon some formulation of the patent danger rule. In thus treating the affirmative defense as an absolute bar, the court would be taking steps to protect the defense from
erosion by unwarranted jury sympathies.
1,9 Several commentators have argued that the main thrust of product liability law is -representational." Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function
and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 Va. L. Rev. 1109 (1974). Professor Shapos
statement of the theory is that:
Judgments of liability for consumer product disappointment should center initially and
principally on the portrayal of the product which is made, caused to be made or permitted
by the seller. This portrayal should be viewed in the context of the impression reasonably
received by the consumer from representations or other communications made to him
about the product by various means: through advertising, by the appearance of the
product, and by the other ways in which the product projects an image on the mind of the
consumer, including impressions created by widespread social agreement about the product's function. This judgment should take into consideration the result objectively determinable to have been sought by the seller, and the sellers apparent motivation in making
or permitting the representation or communication.
These determinations of liability should consider, generally, the integrated image of
the product against the background of the public communications that relate to It. and
should refer, specifically, to those communications concerning the haraeteristics or features of the product principally related to the element of disappointment, and to the
question of whether these characteristics or features reasonably might have aroused conflict with respect to the decision to buy or otherwise to encounter the product.
Id. at 1370 (italics omitted). See also Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A
Decade of Litigation, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 1185, 118-89 (1976).
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danger is latent or any form of deception exists, so the argument runs,

the defendant should be held liable on a failure to warn theory.1t0

When a product is honestly marketed, it is questionable whether, in

addition to mandating honesty in the marketplace, the courts should
mandate safety as well. It may be, however, that a principled reason
underlies the refusal of courts to impose safety standards on manufacturers whose products carry only obvious dangers: there must be some
limit to judicial paternalism in the field of product safety. Some

products are so mechanically and functionally simple, and the dangers
they present so manifest, that liability is unwarranted. 1 9'
Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co. 1'2
is, in my opinion, such a case. Plaintiff, a two year old, was injured
when, left alone in his grandfather's backyard, he climbed a retract-

able ladder left in the down position to an above-ground swimming
pool and fell in. Plaintiff contended that the swimming pool was
defectively designed because the manufacturer had failed to take the
reasonable and low cost precaution of building the swimming pool so

that the fencing extended across the deck at the top of the ladder
opening, with a self-latching gate on the deck of the swimming pool.

Such a design would prevent access to the swimming pool area by
young children even when the ladder from the deck to the ground was
in the down position.
The Wisconsin court dismissed the complaint, holding that, as a
matter of law, the swimming pool was not defectively designed. Its
reason for so holding was that the "consumer expectation" test demanded such a result. The court said:
If the average consumer would reasonably anticipate the dangerous
condition of the product and fully appreciate the attendant risk of

190 This was the import of many of the earlier product cases. See, e.g., Creenman v. Yuba

Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (19063);
Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 472-73, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950).
191The unwillingness of some courts to impose liability for common dangers is in this author's
opinion best expressed in this way. To illustrate this point, see Jamieson v. Woodward &
Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 29-30 (D.C. Cir.) (elasticized rope has propensity to snap back upon
itself), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957); Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 930.
934, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483, 484-85 (1976) (slingshots can be used to propel rocks); Cenaust v,
Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill. 2d 456, 466, 343 N.E.2d 465, 471 (1976) (metals conduct electricity
and are not to be used near live high voltage wires); Fanning v. LeMay, 38 I11. 2d 209, 211-12,
230 N.E.2d 182, 184-85 (1967) (soles of shoes become slippery when wet); Menard v. Newhall,
135 Vt. 53, 55-56, 373 A.2d 505, 507 (1977) (BB's fired from air rifle can injure eyes). See also
Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 39 (1982).
192 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
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injury, it would not be unreasonably dangerous and defective. This
is an objective test and is not dependent upon the knowledge of the
particular injured consumer .... The lack of a self-latching gate
certainly falls within the category of an obvious rather than a
latent condition. Equally important, the average consumer would
be completely aware of the risk of harm to small children due to
this condition, when the retractable ladder is left in a down position and the children are left unsupervised.'11
It is possible to read Vincer as nothing more than a modern patent
danger case. 194 However, a better reading of Vincer is that the court
was actually undertaking a multifactor analysis. One part of its inquiry reflected a genuine concern with how paternalistic the law
should be with regard to the safety of swimming pools. The injury in
Vincer occurred because children played unsupervised in the immediate vicinity of a swimming pool, a situation fraught with danger. In
such situations, it is clear that modifications in the product would be
meaningless, and the unavoidable conclusion is that the problem is not
one which should appropriately be shouldered by the manufacturer.
A risk-utility analysis will not necessarily lead to the same conclusion. In fact, using risk-utility reasoning, one might conclude that a
particularsafety feature is desirable. Nonetheless, a court utilizing the
multifactor analysis might conclude that:
(1) redesign of the swimming pool fence would require complex
and interdependent changes to be made in the product;
(2) a broad range of choices is available to consumers in the
swimming pool market;
(3) the danger is so inherent and obvious that only parental or
adult supervision is sufficient to prevent it and that courts should not
be forced to play such a paternalistic role.
Whether or not this multifactor reading of Vincer is accepted,
courts ought to be aware of the limits of paternalism. To the extent
that judicial unease with an unduly paternalistic role is embodied in
the patent danger rule, the concept of patent danger remains a valid
factor in any sophisticated duty analysis undertaken by a court.
8. Cost
Courts performing a risk-utility analysis' 9 5 typically consider cost
as one element of the analysis. If the cost of the alternative design
193

Id. at 332-33, 230 N.W.2d at 798-99.

Indeed, I admit to having endorsed this rather facile reading of Vincer. Twerski, From
Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 Marq.
L. Rev. 297, 306-07 (1977).
"5 Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-18 (1973)
(fourth of six factors in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous includes
19
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suggested by the plaintiff exceeds the savings projected from the reduction in the level or severity of injuries, then some commentators
claim the product is not defectively designed.19
In some cases the cost of the suggested alternative design is a
factor not only in the risk-utility analysis but in the duty analysis as
well. Where the dollar cost of the suggested alternative is high, courts
evince some reluctance in letting cases go to the jury.1 0 7 Perhaps this
reluctance stems from the operation of many of the duty factors
already enumerated. An especially high price tag on a suggested
alternative design may signal the presence of other problematic policy
issues; for instance, the more expensive the change the greater the
likelihood it will involve polycentric problems and questions concerning the closeness of proof on the risk-utility issue. However, it is likely
that the cost factor has independent significance stemming from a
sense by courts that they are not the proper political body to make
judgments having potentially drastic impact upon product design
costs. It is admittedly difficult to support this factor with direct authority from case law; the cost of suggested alternatives is rarely
singled out for lengthy comment by the courts. Nonetheless, courts
cannot and should not be oblivious to the cost factor when engaging in
a duty analysis.
9. Design Safety Review Process
There is evidence of increasing emphasis being attached to the
quality of the decisionmaking process leading to the establishment of a
particular product safety level.19 In a recent article written in conjunction with several colleagues, we endorsed the development of a
free-standing defense in design defect cases based on the strength and
integrity of the process by which a manufacturer establishes a particular safety standard. 99 Whether or not the proposal that process be

manufacturer's ability to eliminate unsafe character of the product without rendering It too
expensive for its normal use); Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. Rev. 803, 818 (1976) (second of
four factors in determining liability is the incremental cost of marketing the product without the
offending condition).
"I Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. Legal Stud. 103, 133 (1980);
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29, 32-33 (1972) (discussing Judge Learned
Hand's formulation of the negligence standard in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d
169 (2d Cir. 1947)).
197See, e.g., Garst v. General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 22, 484 P.2d 47, 62 (1971); Skyhook
Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 146-47, 560 P.2d 934, 936-37 (1977).
See generally Tverski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 1.
See generally id.
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recognized as a single factor no-duty test is accepted,2 00 evidence of
excellent process is a relevant component of a multifactor no-duty test.
Manufacturers who have made good faith efforts to use the skill and
ingenuity at their disposal to develop good standards deserve the
protection of the courts from the vagaries of improvident jury verdicts
in close-call cases. This is especially true when the trial judge has
determined that the evidence on defect is very closely balanced. In
arguing for increased judicial sensitivity to the quality of the safety
standard-setting process at the preproduction stage of manufacture,
we noted that "to appreciate the significance of focusing on the process or product development, one must understand the complexity of
the design process, the various stages at which critical decisions are
made, and the array of competing interests and points of view that
affect decisions at each stage." 2"' The theory underlying this defense is
based on an awareness that as the development of the product progresses, "the quality and the nature of the decisionmaking process
change significantly."2' 02 At certain stages of the process, design decisions of a fundamental nature may be easily incorporated in the
product; later on, such decisions may entail radical and costly alterations. Awareness of this process is significant for design defect litigation in that "we may be less willing to second-guess decisions made on
the basis of limited alternatives if: (1) the alternatives were carefully
considered at an early stage of product development; (2) the reasons
for rejecting certain alternatives are clearly articulated; and (3) few
viable alternatives were available."2 0 3 We suggested that a formal
recognition be given to a process defense:20 4 if a manufacturer establishes that a standard was set pursuant to an exhaustive, highly structured process representing the competing concerns of safety, utility,
efficiency, and aesthetics, a product will be presumed nondefective
unless the plaintiff proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence.
In the context of a multifactor duty analysis, when many of the other
duty factors are also present, the court should decide the initial duty
question taking into account that the process by which the safety
standard was established was of the highest order.

wSee Henderson, Should Process Defense Be Recognized in Design Defect Cases?, 56 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 585 (1981), and the response, Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Pichler, In Defense of
Process, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 616 (1981).
01 Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & PiehIer, Shifting Perspectives, supra note 1, at 353-59
(footnotes omitted).
202

Id.

203 Id.

2" Id. at 375-80.
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10. Legislation

One major item in many legislative proposals concerning the
product liability crisis is the legal effect to be given to compliance with
statutory product safety standards. 20 5 Manufacturers complain that it
is unfair to subject them to liability after they have complied with
rigorous and exacting state or federal standards. 208 Consumer groups
fear that governmental standards are often the product of political
207
compromise and thus not reflective of the optimal level of safety.

The statutory enactments reflect legislative ambivalence. On the one
hand, they provide that compliance with the statutory standard be
deemed evidence of or create a presumption of nondefectiveness subject to rebuttal by the plaintiff.20 8 On the other hand, they permit the

plaintiff to demonstrate that the legislative standard is unreasonable.2 0 9 An argument can be made that these proposals are merely
restatements of the traditional common law position and add nothing
210
new to the law of torts.

205 The most recent attempt to resolve the problem of compliance with regulatory standards
can be found in MUPLA § 1O8A, which provides:
When the injury-causing aspect of the product was, at the time of manufacture, in
compliance with legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory safety standards relating to design or performance, the product shall be deemed not defective .. unless the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonably prudent
seller could and would have taken additional precautions.
MUPLA, supra note 11, at § 108A. Some recently enacted state statutes go beyond MUPLA by
creating either an affirmative defense or a rebuttable presumption that a product is nondefectivo
or not unreasonably dangerous based on compliance with regulatory standards. See, e.g., Colo.
Rev. Stat. § 13-21-403(1)(b) (Supp. 1980) (rebuttable presumption); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507D:4 (Supp. 1979) (affirmative defense); Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-28-104 (1980) (rebuttable presumption); Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3) (1977) (rebuttable presumption).
2O6See MUPLA, supra note 11, at 62,730 (analysis commenting on § 108). Manufacturers also
point out the unfairness in permitting lay jurors to reevaluate standards determined by govern.
ment experts. Id.
207 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Select Committee on Small Business on Product
Liability Problems Affecting Small Business, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1584, 1593-94 (1976) (statement of Ralph Nader, Center for Study of Responsive Law (arguing against lobbying effort by
both insurers and manufacturers to establish adherence to governmental standards as an "ironclad" defense)); Birnbaum, Reform or Retreat?, supra note 16, at 277-79 (recognizing that state
and federal standards often are simply the voluntary standards adopted by manufacturers within
an industry); Johnson, Products Liability "Reform": A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.L. Rev.
677, 687-89 (1978) (acknowledging the power and influence of manufacturers in the formation
of government standards).
208 See statutes cited at note 205 supra.
209 Id.

ZG The provision in the MUPLA § 108A, set forth in note 205 supra, does not appear to
accomplish anything more than to restate the traditional common law approach. It does not shift
the burden of proof because the plaintiff bears the burden of proving defect. Every product at
the outset is deemed "not defective" unless the claimant proves the unreasonableness of the
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It would be a mistake, however, to underrate legislative developments in this area. Legislative and administrative standards play an
important role in limiting the class of potential plaintiffs in design
defect cases. The objective of manufacturers is the establishment of a
single factor no-duty test that would prevent the imposition of liability
when the statutory standard was met. 21 ' This position is anathema to

consumer groups who fear that government will not perform its role
aggressively. 2 2 The result is an unsatisfactory compromise in which
statutory standards occupy an uncertain position.
Under a multifactor analysis, such uncertainty does not arise.
Manufacturer compliance with governmental standards is relevant to
a resolution of the duty question and should be considered by the
court before submitting the design to the scrutiny of a jury. If, in
addition to such compliance, a cluster of other no-duty factors are
present, then a directed verdict might be appropriate. Thus, for example, if the statutory standard governed a technically complex design feature which, if litigated, would create problems of polycentricity, the argument for a directed verdict would be stronger. If the
alternative design feature suggested by the plaintiff is only marginally
superior to the statutory standard, that too would be a factor supporting a directed verdict. And if the suggested alternative safety device is
supported only by untested, hypothetical expert evidence, the case for
a directed verdict would be strengthened even further.

design. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g (1965) (-The burden of proof that
the product was in a defective condition at the time that it left the hands of the particular seller is
upon the injured plaintiff; and unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then defective, the burden is not sustained.").
In an attempt to be evenhanded, the drafters of the MUPLA addressed the question of
noncompliance with a statutory standard:
When the injury-causing aspect of the product was not, at the time of manufacture,
in compliance with legislative regulatory standards or administrative regulatory safety
standards relating to design or performance, the product shall be deemed defective. . . unless the product seller proves by a preponderanceof the ecidence that its failure
to comply was a reasonably prudent course of conduct under the circunmstancs.
MUPLA supra note 11, § 108B, at 62,730 (emphasis added). This section appears to create a
reasonableness defense to negligence per se. It is possible that the drafters meant to excuse a
violation of the statute only when compliance would have created greater dangers than noncompliance. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 288A(e), 295 (1965). The language of § 10SB,
however, would permit a finding of nonnegligence merely because the conduct of the defendant
was reasonable under the circumstances. The doctrine of excused violation, see W. Prosser,
Handbook of the Law of Torts § 36, at 197-200 (4th ed. 1971), was never meant to undermine
the basic standard of care judgment reflected in the statute.
211See Birnbaum, Reform or Retreat?, supra note 16, at 277; U.S. Dep't of Commerce
Interagency Task Force, 1 Product Liability: Final Report of the Insurance Study 4.91 (19771).
212 See note 207 supra.
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There are cases in which the court should direct a verdict based
solely on compliance with a statutory standard, for example, when a
statutory standard is well regarded and the product clearly complies
with the standard. But even when statutory standards, taken alone,
are insufficient to dictate a directed verdict, they may contribute in
part to the final judgment that a directed verdict is proper in a
particular case.
V
CASE LAW AND MULTIFACTOR

DuTY ANALYSIS

The theoretical framework for a multifactor duty analysis and
the ten-factor test for its application have been presented. This Section
will show that courts, in well-reasoned opinions, have used such an
analysis to determine the propriety of directing verdicts. 213 Some
courts that do not appear to be applying a multifactor approach seem
instead to be groping for an analytical framework within which to
reach sensible results in light of the policies implicated in design defect
litigation.
A. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.
Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A. G.214 is a design defect case
involving the "crashworthiness" issue. It is worthy of detailed examination here because the Dreisonstok court touched on many of the
factors that have been suggested as germane to a multifactor duty
analysis. Dreisonstok is a design defect case decided under a negli21 5
gence theory.
213 In addition to the five cases discussed at length in the following section, this Article has

treated other cases as examples of multifactor duty analysis. See, e.g., text accompanying notes
192-94 supra (discussing Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co.). The
following cases suggest that courts wittingly or unwittingly utilize the form of analysis suggested
by this Article: Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1356-62 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'd without
opinion, 591 F.2d 1334 (1978) (factors considered in upholding jury verdict for defendant
included the likelihood of injury, feasibility of eliminating unsafe characteristic without Impairing usefulness or increasing cost, and the contemplated ordinary use of the product); Carst v.
General Motors Corp., 207 Kan. 2, 20-23, 484 P.2d 47, 61-63 (1971) (factors used in determining
manufacturer's liability include whether others are using a safer design, feasibility of a safer
design, and the adequacy of testing); Tibbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 738, 740-42,
358 N.E.2d 460, 461-62 (1976); see also Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447, 456,
461-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (discussion of impracticality of alternative design); Fletcher Co. v.
Melroe Mfg. Co., 238 So. 2d 142, 146-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (discussion of the feasibility
of improving the design, the obviousness of the defect, and the foreseeability of the Injury).
214 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
215 Whether one proceeds under either a negligence or strict liability theory in a design defect
ease, an analysis to determine the propriety of a directed verdict is still necessary. As noted
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In Dreisonstok, the plaintiff was a passenger in a Volkswagen
microbus that struck a telephone pole on the front of the passenger
side of the vehicle. The plaintiff was seated in the center of the seat,
next to the driver, and as a result of the impact, her right leg was
caught between the back of the seat and the dashboard of the van and

she apparently was thrown forward. She sought recovery alleging that
her injuries were enhanced by the vehicle's lack of crashworthiness.2 10

The district court agreed that the microbus was negligently designed
because it failed to provide "sufficient energy-absorbing materials or
devices or 'crush space'... so that at 40 miles an hour the integrity of

the passenger compartment would not be violated."217 As a result, the
plaintiff's injuries were enhanced "over and above those injuries
21 8
which the plaintiff might have incurred."

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's verdict for the

plaintiff.219 It first considered the question whether an automobile

manufacturer has a legal duty to manufacture a crashworthy car. The

court noted the divergence of authority on this issue.220 Some courts
have held that no such duty exists since the "intended use" of an
automobile does not include collisions.-"' The overwhelming majority

of courts, however, have followed Larsen v. GeneralMotors Corp.,'
which requires a manufacturer to design an automobile to prevent
"'unreasonable risk of injury in the event of a collision."= The

Dreisonstok court cast its lot with the majority.-2earlier, one difference between strict liability and negligence in a product liability case is that
newly developed information or technology under a strict liability theory may render the
product defective even though the defendant might not have been negligent in having failed to
discover that information. See notes 131-36 and accompanying text supra. If the issue of newly
developed information or technology is not present in the case, then the duty analysis will
proceed identically whether the operative theory is negligence or strict liability. In Drcisonstok.
neither newly developed information nor technology was at issue. Thus the duty analysis
performed by the court is instructive as to how one should actually proced with a mutifactor
test.
216 489 F.2d at 1068.
217 Id. at 1068-69.
2118
Id. at 1069.

219 Id. at 1076. The action had been tried without a jury. Id. at 1063.
2__ Id. at 1069.

2*' E.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 825 {7th Cir.), cert. denied. 385 U.S.
836 (1966); Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D.N.J. 1973). For a list of early cases
rejecting the lack of crashworthiness as a basis for liability, see Hoenig & Goetz, Crashworthy
Automobiles, supra note 3, at 4 n.l1.
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
223 Id. at 502. Leading courts have approved the Larsen position. For an extensive list of
authorities supporting Larsen, see Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104, 110-11 (7th Cir.
1977).
2" In retrospect, its decision to abandon the minority view was sound, since that view was
later repudiated by the court that created it. In Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th
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The court's rejection of such a single factor no-duty test, which
would bar second collision claims, did not resolve the issue whether to
impose liability. It did, however, enable the court to expand its inquiry and examine many of the factors that this Article has suggested
are central to a multifactor approach. In opining that the court
utilized a multifactor duty analysis to reach its directed verdict, one
must refute the argument that the court, sitting in the capacity of
super-jury, simply found the evidence of negligence unsatisfactory.
Both the language and the tone of the opinion suggest that the court
was speaking in broad public policy terms. More importantly, the
court directly addressed many of the duty factors identified by this
Article.
(1) Polycentricity: To have been sufficiently crashworthy to withstand a collision of this magnitude, the microbus would have required
the front-end protection of a 1966 front-engine automobile. This level
of safety would have necessitated major redesign of the microbus and
the sacrifice of many of its most desirable features. Although the court
did not label this problem "polycentric," it seemed reluctant to evaluate and impose judicially such a potentially drastic design modification. The court's language on this point is instructive:
Under this standard, any rear engine car would be "inherently
dangerous." ...To avoid liability for negligent design, no manufacturer could introduce any innovative or unique design, even
though reasonably calculated to provide some special advantage
such as greater roominess. Such a strait-jacket on design is not
imposed, whether the rule applied is that of Evans or of Larsen.2 5
Whether viewed as polycentric, merely too complex, or inappropriate
for judicial resolution, the court deemed this aspect of the case to be
important in its ultimate decision to direct a verdict.
(2) Close Risk-Utility Proof: In the earlier discussion of this factor, it was noted that extraordinary tensions exist in the litigation of a
design defect case.2 26 The plaintiff has the luxury of pinpointing the
design feature that would have prevented the injury. The defendant

Cir. 1977), the Seventh Circuit concluded that "[t]here is no rational basis for limiting the
manufacturer's liability to those instances where a structural defect has caused the collision and
resulting injury .... Since collisions for whatever cause are foreseeable events, the scope of
liability should be commensurate with the scope of the foreseeable risks." Id. at 109.
225 Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1075 (4th Cir. 1974).
220 See text accompanying notes 112-21 supra.
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must then focus on the overall design of the product and either demonstrate that the suggested alternative design presents greater dangers
in other situations or argue that the product's utility would be reduced
by the design alternative. In either event, the defendant must turn the
focus away from the specific accident that actually occurred to a more
general view of the product's design. It was suggested that, given this
imbalance, courts should proceed cautiously and assure themselves
that the evidence presented by the plaintiff is clearly sufficient to
support the overall superiority of the plaintiff's design alternative. If
the court is not convinced that the defendant made a poor design
choice, it should direct a verdict.
There are indications in Dreisonstok that the court was aware of
this tension between the plaintiff's proof and the defendant's rebuttal
testimony. The court made numerous references to the fact that the
forty-mile-per-hour crashworthiness standard proffered by the plaintiff was created out of thin air, saying:
And why "40 miles an hour" as the standard anyvay? This standard was adopted, it seems clear from the District Court's order,
because the plaintiffs contended that a "standard American passenger car" had sufficient "crash space" that its passenger compartment would not have been invaded in a 40 mile impact.2 7
The court then noted that creating a standard on the basis of causation
was not sufficient since it was necessary to consider the "special purpose and character of the particular type of vehicle" before establishing the appropriate standard.22 The Dreisonstokcourt thus appears to
have recognized the suspect, litigious character of the standard in
deciding to direct a verdict for defendant.
(3) State of the Art: The earlier discussion of the "state of the art"
issue raised the question of how exacting the courts should be regarding the quality of expert testimony.2 29 Is it sufficient for experts to
present unsupported opinions or should courts require proof through
extensive testing that the alternative designs proffered by the plaintiffs
are in fact practicable?
The issue arose in Dreisonstok, not with regard to the standards
issue, but with regard to causation. The court appeared unwilling to
accept the untested hypothesis of the experts that the second collision

27

-

489 F.2d at 1075.
Id. at 1076.
See text accompanying notes 123-30 supra.
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damages were avoidable. The court criticized the forty-mile-per-hour
crashworthiness standard as resulting merely from the plaintiffs' experts' comparative measurements of the interior space of a microbus
and of a 1966 Ford passenger car. "No tests were made by these
experts to confirm experimentally these conclusions. . . [B]ecause
the distance in the latter instance was greater than in the former, they
concluded that, had the plaintiff been riding in a 1966 Ford passenger
car, she would have escaped injury. ' ' 230 Given the relationship between causation and defect in this case, it appears that the court's
dissatisfaction with the quality of the expert testimony was an additional factor that may have tipped the scales in the court's decision to
direct the verdict.
(4) Tenuous Causation: Second collision cases present difficult
causation issues. 23' The plaintiff must establish that the injury was
aggravated by the absence of the proposed safety feature, must prove
the extent of the aggravation, and must translate the "add-on" damages into a dollar figure. In some cases, these tasks are very difficult,
in others, they are virtually impossible. As the severity of the first
collision increases, it becomes more difficult to establish the second
collision damages. When this difficult determination presents itself,
courts demonstrate considerable reluctance to let the case go forward.
This reluctance is especially apparent when the evidence on both sides
2 32
of the design defect issue is evenly balanced.
The court in Dreisonstok was clearly troubled by this aspect of
the case and appears to have considered it in support of its directed
verdict, noting:
It, perhaps, may not be amiss to note that there is not substantial evidence to sustain a finding that as a result of the design of the
microbus the plaintiffs injuries were enhanced.... It may be that
in every case the injuries may be somewhat different but any
"head-on" collision at a speed of 40 miles an hour or more will
result in severe injuries to the occupants of a vehicle and, certainly
in 1968, no design short of an impractical and exorbitantly expensive tank-like vehicle ...could have protected against such injuries...
. Can it be said that a manufacturer in 1968 must have, in
its design, so built its vehicle as to protect
against such an "unrea233
sonable risk of injury"? We think not.

230488 F.2d at 1075-76.

See text accompanying notes 156-58 supra.
See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 736-38 (3d Cir. 1976).
133 489 F.2d at 1076 (footnote and citations omitted).
231
232
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The court thus added another element to the directed verdict
decision-the tenuousness of the causation issue. It is, of course,
impossible to tell whether, absent the other no-duty factors, the
Dreisonstok court would have directed a verdict for defendant solely
on causation grounds. What is significant, however, is that the court
felt it necessary to relate the causation issue to the other no-duty
factors in the case in order to bolster its directed verdict.
(5) Consumer Choice: The court noted that the microbus was a
popular vehicle with "special utility as a van for the transportation of
light cargo, as a family camper, as a station wagon and for use by
passenger groups too large for the average passenger car." -3t The
consumer had thus selected from a wide array of alternative models
the one that fit his special needs. The Dreisonstokcourt acknowledged
that consideration of such choices should be permitted in the design
process, citing Dyson v. General Motors Corp.25 and its proposition
that "design safety must take account of 'differentiation between various models of automobile' and involves 'a recognition of the inherent
characteristics of each.' ",236 Consistent with its attitude toward
choice, the court noted that price must also be considered in the
assessment of safety and that "a Cadillac may be expected to include
more in the way of both conveniences and 'crashworthiness" than the
economy car."2 37 This consideration bore heavily on its resolution of

the case in favor of the defendant manufacturer.
(6) Obviousness of Danger: The Dreisonstok court also discussed
the obvious nature of the danger. The court did so even though there
was neither a legitimate question of assumption of risk2as nor a plausible argument that the obviousness of the danger increased risk reduction in this case. Appreciation of the danger could not lead to consumer behavior aimed at reducing the risk level unless drivers made a
concerted effort to drive more carefully while in microbuses. The only
rationale supporting the consideration of the obviousness of the danger as a factor in Dreisonstok is that the court was averse to treating

2-4 Id.

at 1074.
235 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
236489 F.2d at 1072 (quoting Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. at 1073).
2 489 F.2d at 1073.
m The plaintiff was a passenger in the microbus. The passenger is unlikely to have had
sufficient appreciation of the risk even to raise the issue of -subjective" knowledge of risk. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496D (1965); text accompanying notes 183-88 supra. Plaintiff,
however, had not fastened her seatbelt. 489 F.2d at 1076.
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consumers with overbearing paternalism. The language of the court
supports this reading:
This design was uniquely developed in order to provide the owner
with the maximum amount of either cargo or passenger space in a
vehicle inexpensively priced and of such dimensions as to make
possible easy maneuverability. To achieve this, it advanced the
driver's seat forward, bringing such seat in close proximity to the
front of the vehicle, thereby adding to the cargo or passenger space.
This, of course, reduced considerably the space between the exact
front of the vehicle and the driver's compartment. All of this was
readily discernibleto any one using the vehicle;23in
fact, it was, as
91
we have said, the unique feature of the vehicle.
The consumers had chosen for themselves, and the court did not wish
to impose paternalistic safeguards by judicially raising the safety
standards of the manufacturers.
(7) Legislation: At the time of Dreisonstok, there was no legislation directly covering the crashworthiness of the microbus. The court,
24 1
however, did note2 40 that the Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act,
' 42
which undertakes "to establish motor vehicle safety standards,"
requires the Secretary of Transportation in setting standards to "consider whether any such proposed standard is reasonable, practicable
and appropriate for the particular type of motor vehicle."2 43 The
court interpreted this guidance to require a consideration of the differentiation of purpose among vehicles of the same general type in setting
2 44
safety standards.
Although the court did not find this expression of legislative
intent binding in a common law action, the court did consider the
legislative framework in deciding how broad the scope of the riskutility inquiry should be. The existence of legislation permitted the
court to narrow its inquiry substantially and to conclude that it would
be inappropriate to compare the microbus with other vehicles whose
function and design were so radically different.2 4 5 The legislation's
existence and guidance helped the court reach the conclusion that a
directed verdict was appropriate.

489 F.2d at 1073-74 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
at 1072.
241 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
239

210 Id.

242

Id. § 1381.

244

Id. § 1392(f)(3).
489 F.2d at 1072.

245

Id. at 1073-75.

.43
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Dreisonstok is heavily laden with the factors that should contribute to the conclusion that the manufacturer has met its duty to consumers. Had the court clearly identified the policy factors bearing on
its decision, the decision could have served as a model for other courts
faced with similar questions of social policy. As it stands, Dreisonstok
is too easily relegated to the run-of-the-mill "reasonable-people-cannot-differ" category. With this Article's clearer articulation of the
relevant policies, the case can become a significant decision that
points the way to high-level judicial lawmaking.
B. Uloth v. City Tank Corporation
A case that would have benefited from a multifactor duty analysis is Uoth v. City Tank Corp.246 In that case plaintiff was a townemployed general laborer. He had helped with trash collection on
several occasions and twice had been assigned to a Loadmaster 316
garbage truck. The design of the Loadmaster included a rear step
running the full width of the truck on which the workers rode. Above
the step was a "trash hopper" area into which trash was loaded. A
packer blade swept through this trash hopper area during the compaction cycle, coming in contact with the loading sill, and pushed the
trash into the storage area of the truck.
The compaction cycle on the Loadmaster 316 was activated by
placing the truck in neutral, operating several switches in the cab, and
pulling a lever on the side of the truck, after which the packer blade
would descend. The compaction cycle could be interrupted at any
time by disengaging the lever at the side of the truck.
On the day of the accident the plaintiff operated the lever once
without incident. Ten minutes after starting work, Uloth signalled the
driver to put the truck in neutral and activate the swvitches in the cab,
after which the plaintiff operated the lever on the side of the truck and
lit a cigarette. When he heard the engine noise increase and saw the
truck move slightly, the plaintiff assumed that the truck was about to
move ahead, and leapt onto the rear step of the truck. He lost his
balance; the descending panel caught his left foot, dragged it into the
trash hopper, and severed it from his leg.
Uloth is of particular interest because the packer was purchased
by a municipality which had the option to purchase competing models
equipped with safety features that might well have prevented the
accident. The plaintiff contended that the Loadmaster 316 was defec-

N6

376 Mass. 874, 384 N.E.2d 1188 (1978).
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tively designed due to its continuous cycle compaction mechanism,
and pointed to other companies using safety devices such as interlocking hopper doors, a stop bar, an interrupted cycle or a "deadman
control. '2 47 In addition, plaintiff argued that had the steps on the
garbage truck been placed on the side
rather than in the rear the
248
occurred.
have
not
would
accident
The issue of design defect was sharply disputed. Defendant argued that the competition's compaction chambers equipped with the
safety devices had a much faster compaction cycle, 4 9 while the Loadmaster's slower cycle permitted the user to become aware of the
slowly descending panel and avoid danger. Furthermore, defendant
argued that the more sophisticated safety devices were unusually
dangerous in that sanitation workers seeking to find shortcuts around
time-consuming safety features might bypass them so that they could
complete their work more quickly. Thus, according to the defendant,
in this instance the simpler design that was not subject to tampering
was in truth safer than the more complex design which offered a
surface appearance of greater safety.25 0 The court acknowledged that
there was conflicting evidence but held that the controverted issue
25
was for the jury to resolve. '
The facts of Uloth suggest it may be unwise to separate the issue
of the safety standard from the issue of who should be responsible for
setting the standard. If the contest between the design actually utilized and the possible alternatives is a close one, then why not permit
the decision to be made by a sophisticated buyer, able to assess the
product in an actual employment setting? A municipality that requires a set number of hours per week from its sanitation workers may
make a judgment different from that of a city that permits the workers to leave the job after completing the assigned route. In the first
case the town may choose the machine with the safety feature because
there is little incentive for employees to bypass safety mechanisms to
complete work more quickly. In the latter instance the city may
choose the simpler but slower compaction chamber in order to prevent the bypass problem. In any event, when the choice among safety
features is closely balanced, a manufacturer should not be required to
impose safety of one kind on an entire industry.

247
248
249

Id. at 878 n.4, 384 N.E.2d at 1191 n.4.
Id.
Brief for Appellant at 7, Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 376 Mass. 874, 384 N.E.2d 1188

(1978).
2Sw Id.
251

376 Mass. at 878 n.4, 384 N.E.2d at 1191 n.4.
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Were Uoth to be evaluated on the basis of the duty factors
proposed in this Article, there would be an extremely strong argument
in favor of a directed verdict. Consider the following points:
(1) Polycentricity: The choice of the safety mechanism had major
implications for the operation of the entire compaction operation,
affecting the speed of compaction, the minimum number of workers
necessary to operate the truck, the engine mechanism, the location of
the steps on the truck, etc.
(2) Close Risk-Utility Proof: The proof issue was clouded at best.
The Loadmaster design was standard, well accepted, and popular.
The imbalance between the specifically directed plaintiff's case and
the more general design defense was particularly telling.
(3) Consumer Choice: There was a broad range of competing
products and designs from which the purchaser chose.
(4) Obviousness of Danger: The danger was open and obvious, so
much so that defendant argued that assumption of risk was made out
as a matter of law. 252 The court refused to direct a verdict on this issue
saying that it rarely directed a verdict on this affirmative defense. - -3
The danger that the jury would permit the plaintiff to recover even
though the evidence on assumption of risk was strong clearly existed
here.
(5) Shifting Duty: The decision to purchase was made by a
sophisticated buyer best positioned to evaluate the dangers present in
its own employment setting.
The point need not be labored. Where many of the no-duty
factors exist in combination, courts should bear in mind not only the
limitations on judicial competence to set design standards but also the
appropriateness of distributing responsibility in a market situation
where decisionmakers other than the manufacturer play a legitimate
role in deciding whether the standard is appropriate for their needs.
C. Another Look at Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corporation
In an earlier section, Wilson v. PiperAircraft Corp.A was identified as a case in which a court took seriously its lawmaking role in
design defect litigation.2

55

In Wilson, plaintiffs' decedents were killed

in an airplane crash allegedly resulting from carburetor icing. Plain-

-

Id. at 881-82, 384 N.E.2d at 1191-92.
Id. at 882, 384 N.E.2d at 1193.
2-' 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978).
2-3

" See text accompanying notes 89-95 supra.
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tiffs contended that, had the airplane been equipped with an injection-type fuel system, the accident would have been averted.
An in-depth examination of the Wilson decision reveals a confluence of the no-duty factors that have been presented as relevant to a
directed verdict decision. The presence of these factors accounts for
the directed verdict in Wilson even though there appears to have been
sufficient evidence to have given the design defect issue to the jury.2 10
Plaintiffs' suggestion that a fuel injection system be installed in
the aircraft required highly polycentric decisionmaking on the part of
the court. The impact of the alternative design upon the "airplane's
cost, economy of operation, maintenance requirements, over-all per27
formance, or safety in respects other than susceptibility to icing" 1
would have to be determined in order to evaluate the alternative
system fairly. The court was concerned that the evidence on these
issues raised real questions as to the clarity of proof on the design
defect issue.2,58 The court noted that eighty to ninety percent of all
25 0
small airplanes were manufactured with a carbureted engine,
thereby indicating a reluctance to interfere with an apparently popular product.
There was considerable discussion in Wilson about the role of
legislative standards.2 60 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
had specifically approved the design of the carburetor engine and had
issued the airplane in question a certificate of crashworthiness. 20 ' FAA
approval had continued even though the FAA was aware of the icing
problems inherent in the design. The court stated "it is proper to take
into consideration, in determining whether plaintiffs have produced
sufficient evidence of defect to go to the jury,the fact that the regulatory agency has approved the very design of which they complain
' 2 62
after considering the dangers involved.
Wilson supports the multifactor thesis in full measure. The court
made clear its belief that compliance with administrative safety stand-

1-1 There appears to have been sufficient evidence on the issue of the unreasonableness of the
carbureted engine. The court noted that carbureted airplane engines are characteristically
subject to icing that can cause engine failure and that fuel-injected engines are not subject to such
icing. There was also evidence that fuel-injected engines of appropriate horsepower were available. Experts testified that FAA approval probably could have been obtained for such airplanes.
See Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. at 70, 577 P.2d at 1327.
257 Id. at 70, 577 P.2d at 1327.
2- See id.
29 Id.
260 Id. at 64-65, 70-71, 577 P.2d at 1324-25, 1327-28.
261 Id. at 64, 577 P.2d at 1324.
262 Id. at 70-71, 577 P.2d at 1328.
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ards should be one factor in a court's decision of whether there is
sufficient risk-utility evidence to permit a case to go to the jury. The
court was unwilling to allow a close-call, risk-utility case to proceed
when the allegedly defective standard was set by a respected agency
that had been aware of the very hazard at issue.
The concurring opinion of Judge Linde 0 3 adds one additional
perspective to the case. He notes that in judging the efficacy of governmental standards it is important to examine the process by which
the agency reached its conclusions so that a court can be assured that
the agency did in fact address risk-utility considerations in a comprehensive fashion. 26 4 This observation relates to the "process" aspect of
the duty analysis discussed earlier.265 The court's seeming satisfaction
with this aspect of the case strengthened its conclusion that a directed
verdict was appropriate under the facts of Wilson.
D. Skyhook Corporation v. Jasper
Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper2 66 is another example of a directed
verdict decision best explained by reference to a multifactor analysis.
In Skyhook, plaintiff's decedent, as apprentice to a journeyman sign
installer, used a 100-foot telescoping crane to position a heavy signpost. Clearly visible on the boom was a warning concerning the
danger of allowing the equipment within ten feet of high voltage
lines. Both the journeyman and the apprentice worker had read the
warning, and both were aware of the presence of overhead high
voltage wires at the work site. The crane was positioned according to
the journeyman's estimates, but no measurements were taken to assure that no portion of the equipment could come within ten feet of
the lines. When the lift cable somehow came into contact with the
overhead power lines, plaintiff's decedent was electrocuted.2C7
Plaintiff alleged that the crane was defectively designed because
it was not equipped with either an "insulated link" or a "proximity
warning device." An insulated link isolates the lifting hook from the
cable so that there is no electrical continuity between the crane and
the load being lifted. No manufacturer installed this device as standard equipment at the time the crane in question was manufactured,
but it was available for $300 to $400, depending on the size of the

263 Id. at 79-87, 577 P.2d at 1332-36.
Id. at 82-86, 577 P.2d at 1333-35.
See text accompanying notes 199-204 supra.
- 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977).
_ Id. at 145, 560 P.2d at 936.
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link. A proximity warning device sets off an alarm if the crane is
positioned at the minimum distance desired from the power line. At
the time of sale, this item was not sold by any crane manufacturer as
either standard or optional equipment. At the time of the accident,
the cost of such a device was $700.
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's directed verdict for the defendant. In doing so the court found
as a matter of law that the seller's failure to include an optional safety
device did not render the crane defective and emphasized that the
product was not unreasonably dangerous for the "ordinary consumer
or user of such a rig when used in the ordinary ways and for the
20 8
ordinary purposes for which such a rig is used.
It is possible to interpret Skyhook as nothing more than a modern
case reaffirming the patent danger rule. 269 Such a reading, in my
opinion, misconstrues the New Mexico court's position. Although the
court noted that the two operators of the rig were aware of the
overhead wires and had accounted for them in positioning the rig, it
made no direct reference to the patent danger doctrine nor to the
leading cases that have become synonymous with it. If the court was
not applying the single factor patent danger rule, why then did it
direct a verdict rather than let the case go to the jury to determine
whether or not the product was unreasonably dangerous?
The court's decision was based on far more than the obviousness
of the danger. Several factors that have been suggested as central to
the multifactor analysis were present in Skyhook. First, it is important
to note that with regard to the patent danger rule itself, the facts of
Skyhook implicated all of the policies supporting the rule in its traditional form.2 70 The obviousness of the danger and the warning were of
such magnitude that they drastically reduced the probability of harm.
Indeed the court made note of the fact that the crane in question had
been used by the employer for five years without incident. 271 The
assumption of risk issue was present in Skyhook as well. The plaintiff's
decedent and his coworker had both been specifically warned about
the overhead wires and had supposedly positioned the crane to allow
for sufficient clearance. A court might be reluctant to submit this kind
of assumption of risk question to the vagaries of the jury. Finally, the
class of workers involved in this accident, crane rig operators, are not

28 Id.
269 See
Materials
2"70See
211See

at 147, 560 P.2d at 938.
W. Keeton, D. Owen & J. Montgomery, Products Liability and Safety Cases and
405 (1980); Darling, The Patent Danger Rule, supra note 172, at 605 n.168.
text accompanying notes 180, 183-91 supra.
90 N.M. 143, 145, 147, 560 P.2d 934, 936 (1977).
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a group with whom the law should deal in an unduly paternalistic
manner. They are, in general, highly paid and well-disciplined specialists who take care of themselves. For the courts to mandate safety
rather than honesty in product design for such a sophisticated group
seems questionable.
In addition to its being aware of the obvious danger element, the
court took note of the high cost of alternative safety features. This is
not a case of a "cotter-pin" costing a penny or an inexpensive safety
screen;2 72 the alternative safety devices suggested in Skyhook were
expensive, ranging in price between $300 and $700. Their substitution
would have an impact on other cost and safety decisions regarding
other parts of the product. This would create polycentricity problems.
Finally, there is a clear shifting duty issue in Skyhook. Decisions
about the purchase of safety devices can best be made by a purchaser
who knows whether the crane is likely to be used in the vicinity of
high voltage wires. It is highly possible that an employer will be better
situated than the manufacturer to make this sort of safety device
decision. Moreover, in addition to the employer's greater capacity to
make the ultimate decision, an important shifting duty question exists
in regard to the employees themselves. As previously noted, the employees in this case were crane rig operators, who may have independent notions of which safety devices are useful and which are more
trouble than they are worth. It is not startling for a court to take the
position that even if a marginal increase in the safety of the crane were
possible, responsibility for that decision should be shifted from the
judiciary to a knowledgeable and well-organized craft. The custom of
crane rig operators thus becomes part of the duty analysis. Ultimately,
they may have practical control of which safety devices are actually
used on the job site.
E. Dawson v. Chrysler Corporation-A Case in Search
of a Duty Analysis
In Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 73 the Third Circuit affirmed a
several million dollar jury verdict for the plaintiff in a design defect
case. The plaintiff contended that Chrysler's failure to design an
adequately crashworthy automobile caused him to suffer enhanced
injuries in a crash. Although the appeals court affirmed the lower
court verdict, it expressed frustration that it was powerless to do
27 See Patten v. Logemann Bros. Co., 263 Md. 364, 283 A.2d 567 (1971) (patent danger
inherent in operation of printing press); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376. 3S6, 348 N.E.2d
571, 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976) (same).
'" 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
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otherwise. A multifactor duty analysis would have provided the court
274
with the analytical means to reverse the lower court's verdict.
Plaintiff was seriously injured when he lost control of his Dodge
Monaco on a rainy highway. The car ran off the highway, over a
curb, through a small sign, and finally crashed into an unyielding
steel pole fifteen inches in diameter. Due to the force of the impact,
the car was literally wrapped around the pole, and the plaintiff
2 75
sustained injuries that left him quadraplegic.
Plaintiff alleged that the design of the Monaco was defective
because "it did not have a full, continuous steel frame extending
through the door panels, and a crossmember running through the
floor board between the posts located between the front and rear
doors of the vehicle. '2 76 Experts testified that, had such a design been
incorporated into the car, it would have deflected the car off the pole,
allowing only minimal penetration into the passenger space and
2 77
greatly minimizing Dawson's injuries.
Chrysler contended that the Monaco was not defective for the
following reasons: (1) the design complied with all federal vehicle
safety standards; (2) deformation of the body of the vehicle is desirable in most crashes because it absorbs the impact of the crash and
decreases the rate of deceleration on the occupants of the vehicle.
Thus, for most types of accidents, the actual design was safer than the
suggested alternative design; (3) the suggested alternative design
would have added an estimated 200-250 pounds to the weight of the
vehicle; and (4) the suggested alternative design would have added
$300 to the cost of the vehicle.2 78 In addition, Chrysler contended on
appeal that the plaintiff had produced insufficient evidence in support
of the claims that his injuries were caused by the Monaco's design, '
that the proposed alternative design was safer, 280 or that his injuries
were enhanced beyond what they would have been had the suggested
alternative design been substituted. 28 '
274 The court in Dawson was bound under the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 04
(1938), to apply state law and in fact purported to apply the rule of Suter v. San Angelo Foundry
& Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979). The New Jersey Supreme Court in Suter
advocated a highly visible duty approach to tort actions. Id. at 172, 406 A.2d at 151. The
Dawson court actually only paid lip service to the duty analysis, but proceeded to examine tie
issue of unreasonable danger at a considerable length. Id.; 630 F.2d at 956-57. There Is no reison
to believe that the analysis set forth in this Article could not fit the strictures of New Jersey "duty"
law as articulated in Suter.
275 630 F.2d at 953-54.
276 Id. at 954.
277 Id.
278 Id.
2719Id. at 955.

280Id. at 957.
281Id. at 959.
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The court painstakingly reviewed the evidence on the issues of
risk-utility and causation and found it sufficient to support the jury
verdict, at the same time commenting on its limited role as an appellate court reviewing a jury finding. The record was not "critically
deficient of [the] minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury
might reasonably afford relief," and thus required affirmance. 2 That
did not stop the court from decrying a system that permits different
juries in different jurisdictions to reach inconsistent conclusions with
regard to the standard of automobile safety. The court said:
The result of such arrangement is that while the jury found
Chrysler liable for not producing a rigid enough vehicular frame, a
factfinder in another case might well hold the manufacturer liable
for producing a frame that is too rigid. Yet, as pointed out at trial,
in certain types of accidents-head-on collisions-it is desirable to
have a car designed to collapse upon impact because the deformation would absorb much of the shock of the collision, and divert the
force of deceleration away from the vehicle's passengers. In effect,
this permits individual juries applying varying laws in different
jurisdictions to set nationwide automobile safety standards and to
impose on automobile manufacturers conflicting requirements. It
would be difficult for members of the industry to alter their design
and production behavior in response to jury verdicts in such cases,
because their response might well be at variance with what some
other jury decides is a defective design. Under these circumstances,
the law imposes on the industry the responsibility of insuring vast
numbers of persons involved in automobile accidents.23
The Dawson courts could have profited from the use of a multifactor duty analysis in two ways. First, by identifying the duty considerations, the trial court would have been able to free itself from the
chains of fact-sensitive risk-utility analysis and, instead, would have
been able to focus on policy in articulating its lawmaking role. Second, a multifactor duty analysis would require the court to relate each
policy concern to the other policy concerns and to make a directed
verdict judgment based on the totality of the factors involved in the
case. The court is not free under this approach to give the issues
separate examination to determine whether there is sufficient evidence on a given issue to support a prima facie case. A court must be
cognizant that it is dealing with numerous issues, each of which has
implications for important policies in the design defect area. When

28 Id.

Id. at 962.
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many of these issues appear in combination, the court must decide
whether it is just to permit the action to go forward. Utilizing this
approach, I believe it can be demonstrated that Dawson was wrongly
decided.
The design change suggested by the plaintiff would have necessitated highly polycentric decisionmaking: it would have required a
major redesign of the automobile body and would have seriously
affected its style, weight, economy, and cost. The court noted that the
decision to add 200 to 250 pounds of weight to an automobile at a
time when fuel economy was a major national issue was not to be
made lightly.2 8 4 Dawson further illustrates the very serious tension
between the plaintiff's ability to pinpoint the desired design change
that would have prevented his particular injuries and the defendant's
difficulty in persuading a jury that in collisions other than the one
under litigation the design actually used would frequently be superior.
As noted earlier, 28 5 in this type of case the quality of proof required on
the superiority of an alternative design must be considered a significant matter of policy.
The scope of consumer choice in the automobile market constitutes an important policy factor in negating liability. The wide array
of choice and price available makes the market a realistic substitute
for a litigation system unable to guarantee uniformity and fairness in
its results. The reluctance of a court to mandate a safety feature that
would increase the cost per auto by $300 is also understandable. This
would entail a major invasion of the price structure of this particular
model. A court should easily find that this factor alone places the case
286
in a suspect category.
To all of the above factors must now be added a very questionable causation issue. Perhaps there was sufficient expert testimony in
Dawson to prove causation,2 8 7 but one need not be especially astute to

281In expressing concern that the case-by-case approach to automobile safety had an impact
on other "national social and economic goals," the court said:
As we have become more dependent on foreign sources of energy, and as the price of the
energy has increased, the attention of the federal government has been drawn to a search
to find alternative supplies and the means of conserving energy. More recently, the
domestic automobile industry has been struggling to compete with foreign manufacturers
which have stressed smaller, more fuel-efficient cars. Yet, during this same period, Con.

gress has permitted a system of regulation by ad hoc adjudications under which a jury can
hold an automobile manufacturer culpable for not producing a car that Is considerably
heavier, and likely to have less fuel efficiency.
Id. at 962-63.
2- See text accompanying notes 112-21 supra.
2816See text accompanying note 25 supra.
287 See 630 F.2d 950, 960.
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recognize that the level of expertise in this class of cases tends to be
little more than educated guesswork. 288 For the plaintiff to prevail, a

court must submit a polycentric, close-call case with grave social
implications to the jury for its causation "guess." When the plaintiff
won on a defective design theory, despite the fact that the 1974
Monaco met federal standards of crashworthiness set by an agency
with a reputation for considerable expertise, 8 9 it is not difficult to
conclude that the Dawson court should have stepped in and said that
the verdict could not be justified.
CONCLUSION

The time has come for courts to exercise their lawmaking function in tort cases. 290 Design defect litigation presents the courts with
policy questions that deserve serious attention. The pronouncements
of the courts in this area speak to the manufacturing community at
large, which must attempt to divine what awaits it at the end of the
litigation line. This Article urges the courts to speak with greater
clarity in addressing these concerns.
This paper will be read as highly defense oriented; that is inevitable. I would caution potential critics to be deliberate in their judgment, for I believe that unless rational limitations are grafted onto the
judge-made law of product liability, irrational limitations will come
in their stead. The legislative effort to date has been not only reactionary but illogical as well.29 ' The problem cannot be passed off as one
created by politically powerful lobbies who have imposed their views
on legislative bodies; it goes much deeper. The legislative effort will
remain ineffectual and at times irrational because the law of torts
cannot be effectively legislated. There are too many nuances that
require the touch of a common law judge. But to make judging
effective, the judiciary must be provided adequate analytical tools
with which to resolve these newfound problems. This Article has
suggested a set of guidelines for design defect litigation. It will have
served its purpose if it opens inquiry into the art of creative judging.

See Hoenig & Goetz, Crashworthy Automobiles, supra note 3, at 78-80.
, See 640 F.2d 950, 954, 957.

z See Owen, supra note 191, at 50-59 (1982).
21

See notes 16 & 210 supra.
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